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The Law of Cyber-Attack
Oona A. Hathaway, Rebecca Crootof, Philip Levitz, Haley Nix,
Aileen Nowlan, William Perdue & Julia Spiegel*
Cyber-attacks have become increasingly common in recent
years. Capable of shutting down nuclear centrifuges, air defense
systems, and electrical grids, cyber-attacks pose a serious threat to
national security. As a result, some have suggested that cyber-attacks
should be treated as acts of war. Yet the attacks look little like the
armed attacks that the law of war has traditionally regulated. This
Article examines how existing law may be applied—and adapted and
amended—to meet the distinctive challenge posed by cyber-attacks. It
begins by clarifying what cyber-attacks are and how they already are
regulated by existing bodies of law, including the law of war,
international treaties, and domestic criminal law. This review makes
clear that existing law effectively addresses only a small fraction of
potential cyber-attacks. The law of war, for example, provides a
useful framework for only the very small number of cyber-attacks that
amount to an armed attack or that take place in the context of an
ongoing armed conflict. This Article concludes that a new,
comprehensive legal framework at both the domestic and
international levels is needed to more effectively address cyberattacks. The United States could strengthen its domestic law by
giving domestic criminal laws addressing cyber-attacks extraterritorial effect and by adopting limited, internationally permissible
countermeasures to combat cyber-attacks that do not rise to the level
of armed attacks or that do not take place during an ongoing armed
conflict. Yet the challenge cannot be met by domestic reforms alone.
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International cooperation will be essential to a truly effective legal
response. New international efforts to regulate cyber-attacks must
begin with agreement on the problem—which means agreement on
the definition of cyber-attack, cyber-crime, and cyber-warfare. This
would form the foundation for greater international cooperation on
information sharing, evidence collection, and criminal prosecution of
those involved in cyber-attacks—in short, for a new international law
of cyber-attack.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2010, Iran’s nuclear program ground to a halt, the subject of a
sophisticated attack that sent centrifuges spinning wildly out of control. The
weapon? Stuxnet, a computer “worm” that appears to have many authors from
around the world and was likely tested by Americans and Israelis at the Israeli
Dimona complex in the Negev desert.1
A few months later, a so-called “distributed denial of service” attack took
the entire population of Burma off the Internet immediately preceding the
country’s first national election in twenty years.2 Observers suspect that the
military junta in Burma coordinated the attack to shut down the Internet and
thereby restrict the free flow of information,3 but American public officials
1. The seeds for this attack were apparently sown well before 2010. The worm was first
detected in 2008, when it infected networks around the world. It did no damage to most systems. At
first, it was assumed that the attack, which appeared to target nuclear facilities in Iran, was not
successful. Yet, in the fall of 2010, reports spread that Iran’s uranium enriching capabilities had been
diminished. The Stuxnet Worm: A Cyber-Missile Aimed at Iran?, ECONOMIST BABBAGE BLOG (Sept.
24, 2010, 1:32 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2010/09/stuxnet_worm; see also
Jonathan Fildes, Stuxnet Worm ‘Targeted High-Value Iranian Assets,’ BBC NEWS (Sept. 23, 2010,
6:46 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-11388018; William J. Broad et al., Israeli Tests
Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Setback, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2011, at A1. Stuxnet is the first
computer virus known to be capable of specifically targeting and destroying industrial systems such as
nuclear facilities and power grids. Fildes, supra.
2. Burma Hit by Massive Net Attack Ahead of Election, BBC NEWS (Nov. 4, 2010, 3:33 PM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-11693214.
3. See id.
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have resisted blaming the attack on the government, even as they have
criticized the election.4
In the summer of 2011, evidence emerged of a long-suspected
government-sanctioned cyber-attack program in China. In late August, a state
television documentary aired on the government-run China Central Television
appeared to capture an in-progress distributed denial of service attack by
China’s military on a Falun Gong website based in Alabama.5 This revelation
followed on the heels of a report by the McAfee cyber-security company
suggesting that a “state actor”—widely believed to be China—had engaged in a
years-long cyber-attack program aimed at a range of governments, U.S.
corporations, and United Nations groups.6
What law governs these attacks? Some have referred to these and similar
attacks as “cyber-warfare,” suggesting that the law of war might apply.7 Yet the
attacks look little like the armed conflict that the law of war traditionally
regulates. And if they are “warfare,” does that mean that victims of such attacks
might claim the right to use conventional force in self-defense—potentially
legally authorizing Iran, for example, to respond to Stuxnet with a physical
attack?
This Article examines these questions and, in the process, offers new
insights into how existing law may be applied—and adapted and amended—to
meet the distinctive challenge posed by cyber-attacks. It does so in two
principal ways. First, the Article clarifies what cyber-attacks are and how they
relate to existing bodies of law, including the law of war;8 recent international

4. See, e.g., Barack Obama & Michelle Obama, Remarks by the President and the First Lady
in Town Hall with Students in Mumbai, India (Nov. 7, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/2010/11/07/remarks-president-and-first-lady-town-hall-with-students-mumbaiindia; Barack Obama, Statement by President Obama on Burma’s November 7 Elections (Nov. 7,
2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/07/statement-presidentobama-burmas-november-7-elections.
5. Ellen Nakashima & William Wan, China’s Denials on Cyberattacks Undercut, WASH.
POST, Aug. 24, 2011, at A12.
6. David Barboza & Kevin Drew, Security Firm Sees Global Cyberspying, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
3, 2011, at A11. This was not the first suggestion of a program of cyber-attacks on private and
government actors by China. Computer attacks on Google that originated in China were believed to be
part of a broader political and corporate espionage effort and prompted Google to withdraw from the
Chinese market. Ariana Eunjung Cha & Ellen Nakashima, Google Attack Part of Vast Campaign;
Targets Are of Strategic Importance to China, Where Scheme Is Thought to Originate, WASH. POST,
Jan. 14, 2010, at A1.
7. See, e.g., RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT THREAT TO
NATIONAL SECURITY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 6 (2010); Stephen Dycus, Congress’s Role in
Cyber Warfare, J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 155, 162 (2010) (“Cyber warfare, as that term is used
here, refers to conflicts that utilize cyber or electronic weapons either offensively or defensively, or
both.”); Understanding Cyber Warfare, LAWS.COM, http://cyber.laws.com/cyber-warfare (last visited
Apr. 18, 2012).
8. For simplicity’s sake, this Article refers collectively to jus in bello and jus ad bellum as the
“law of war.”
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efforts to directly regulate cyber-attacks; international bodies of law that may
be used to indirectly regulate cyber-attacks; and domestic criminal law.
Second, the Article demonstrates how existing law is deficient and what
needs to be done to improve it. Although such bodies of law do offer some
tools for responding to cyber-attacks, these tools are far from complete or
adequate. The law of war, for example, provides a useful legal framework for
regulating only the very small slice of cyber-attacks that amount to an armed
attack or that take place in the context of an ongoing armed conflict. Other
existing legal frameworks—both domestic and international—offer equally
fragmentary assistance in policing cyber-attacks through law. Examining
existing law leads to a clear conclusion: a new, comprehensive legal framework
is needed to address cyber-attacks.
The terms “cyber-attack,” “cyber-warfare,” and “cyber-crime” are
frequently used with little regard for what they are meant to include. This lack
of clarity can make it all the more difficult to design a meaningful legal
response. We therefore begin this Article in Part I by defining these terms. This
may seem a mundane task, but it is a critical starting point for any reform
effort. To that end, we define “cyber-attack” as “any action taken to undermine
the functions of a computer network for a political or national security
purpose.” We also explain the difference between “cyber-attacks,” “cyberwarfare,” and “cyber-crime,” and describe three common forms of cyberattacks: distributed denial of service attacks, planting inaccurate information,
and infiltration of a secure computer network.9
In Part II, we turn to examining how the law of war might govern cyberattacks. We parse the way the law of war, most of which was developed at a
time when cyber-attacks were inconceivable, applies to this new zone of
conflict. We first apply jus ad bellum—the law governing a state’s right to
resort to armed force—to cyber-attacks. We conclude that most cyber-attacks
do not rise to the level of an armed attack and thus do not justify the use of
armed force in response. “Cyber-warfare” is thus a term properly used only to
refer to the small subset of cyber-attacks that do constitute armed attacks or that
occur in the context of an ongoing armed conflict. This definition is crucial
because it limits the application of the “war” framework to those actions that
actually constitute “war” as a matter of international law. With the scope of
cyber-warfare clear, we then explore how jus in bello—the law governing
conduct in an armed conflict—applies.
9. This definition differs from that currently applied by the U.S. Cyber Command, which uses
the term “Cyber Attack” to apply only to attacks that cause physical damage to property or injury to
persons. E-mail from Gary D. Brown, Col. U.S. Airforce, Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Cyber
Command to author (May 15, 2012 10:07AM) (on file with author). Our terminology allows
differentiation between those attacks that are covered by the law of armed conflict (which we call
cyber-warfare) and those that violate the norm of nonintervention but are not covered by the law of
armed conflict (which we call cyber-attack).
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Because the law of war regulates only a small subset of cyber-attacks, in
Part III we examine other existing legal regimes that could regulate cyberattacks. These include (1) the law of countermeasures, which governs how
states may respond to international law violations that do not justify uses of
force in self-defense; (2) international agreements and other cooperative efforts
to directly regulate cyber-attacks; (3) international agreements that regulate
means or locations of cyber-attacks, including telecommunications, aviation,
space, satellites, and the sea; and (4) U.S. criminal law regulating cyber-attacks.
We conclude that, as with the law of war, these existing bodies of law
effectively address only a small part of the problem—leaving many harmful
cyber-attacks unregulated and uncontrolled by either domestic or international
law.
Finally, in Part IV we consider how the problem of cyber-attacks might be
more effectively addressed, offering recommendations for both domestic and
international reforms. At the domestic level, states may expand the
extraterritorial reach of domestic criminal law and develop plans for the
deployment of customary countermeasures in response to cyber-attacks. Yet an
effective solution to this global challenge cannot be achieved by individual
states acting alone. It will require global cooperation. We therefore outline the
key elements of a cyber-treaty—namely, codifying clear definitions of cyberwarfare and cyber-attack and providing guidelines for international cooperation
on evidence collection and criminal prosecution—that would provide a more
comprehensive and long-term solution to the emerging threat of cyber-attacks.
I.
WHAT IS A CYBER-ATTACK?
The first challenge in evaluating how domestic and international law
might be used to address cyber-attacks is to determine the nature and scope of
the problem we face. Activities in cyberspace defy many of the traditional
categories and principles that govern armed conflict under the law of war. This
Part first offers a precise definition of “cyber-attack.” This step is not only
necessary to the legal analysis that follows, but it also fills a gap in the existing
literature, which often uses the term without clarifying what it is meant to
include and exclude. We then offer three categories of activities that fall within
this definition, illuminating the extraordinary range of activities that fall under
even a carefully constructed and limited definition of “cyber-attacks.” This
serves as a prelude to an analysis of what portion of cyber-attacks are governed
by the law of war and other existing bodies of law.
A. Defining “Cyber-Attack”
For well over a decade, analysts have speculated about the potential
consequences of a cyber-attack. The scenarios—ranging from a virus that
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scrambles financial records or incapacitates the stock market,10 to a false
message that causes a nuclear reactor to shut off11 or a dam to open,12 to a
blackout of the air traffic control system that results in airplane crashes13—
anticipate severe and widespread economic or physical damage. While none of
these scenarios has thus far occurred, numerous cyber-incidents occur
regularly.14 Nevertheless, there is no settled definition for identifying these
incidents as cyber-attacks,15 much less as cyber-warfare. The absence of a
shared definition has made it difficult for analysts from different countries to
develop coordinated policy recommendations and for governments to engage in
coordinated action. Hence the technical project of defining cyber-attack is an
important first step toward addressing the growing threat posed by cyberattacks. After describing some existing definitions, we offer a definition that
effectively encompasses the activity that lies at the heart of the concerns raised
by cyber-attacks.16
1. Existing Conceptions of Cyber-Attack
Existing definitions of “cyber-attack” and related terms vary widely.
Perhaps one of the most widely cited definitions comes from government
security expert Richard A. Clarke, who defines cyber-war as “actions by a
nation-state to penetrate another nation’s computers or networks for the
purposes of causing damage or disruption.”17 Similarly, former NSA and CIA
director Michael Hayden has spoken of cyber-war as the “deliberate attempt to
disable or destroy another country’s computer networks.”18 These definitions,
however, do not distinguish between a cyber-crime, cyber-attack, and cyberwar.19 As a result, they are open to a dangerously broad application of the war
framework in the cyber context.20 In addition, Clarke’s definition is too narrow

10. Duncan B. Hollis, Why States Need an International Law for Information Operations, 11
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1023, 1042 (2007).
11. Vida M. Antolin-Jenkins, Defining the Parameters of Cyberwar Operations: Looking for
Law in All the Wrong Places?, 51 NAVAL L. REV. 132, 140 (2005).
12. Barton Gellman, Cyber Attacks by al Qaeda Feared; Terrorists at Threshold of Using
Internet as Tool of Bloodshed, Experts Say, WASH. POST, June 27, 2002, at A1.
13. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL: WEAK COMPUTER SECURITY
PRACTICES JEOPARDIZE FLIGHT SAFETY (May 1998).
14. See, e.g., infra Part I.B (providing recent examples of cyber-attacks).
15. As distinct from cyber-crime. See infra Part I.B.
16. In Part IV of this Article, we explore methods by which the U.S. government and other
governments can adopt the proposed definition or a similar, uniform definition.
17. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 7, at 6; see, e.g., More Than Firewalls: Three Challenges
to American Cyber Security, ASYMMETRIC THREAT (Aug. 2011), http://asymmetricthreat.net/docs/
snapshot2011_08.pdf (citing Clarke’s definition); Understanding Cyber Warfare, supra note 7.
18. Tom Gjelten, Extending the Law of War to Cyberspace, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 22,
2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130023318 (last visited Apr. 18, 2012).
19. See infra Part I.A.3 for a discussion of the importance and mechanics of distinguishing
between the concepts of cyber-attack and cyber-crime.
20. See infra Part II.A for a detailed exploration of jus ad bellum as it applies to cyber-attacks.
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in one respect: it limits the definition to attacks perpetrated by nation-states,
thereby excluding entirely plausible scenarios in which attacks are carried out
by non–state actors.
Technical experts have proposed more limited definitions. For example, in
his famous and prescient 1995 work on information warfare, Martin Libicki
limits cyber-warfare to semantic attacks—digital assaults that cause systems to
seem to operate normally, when in fact they generate “answers at variance with
reality.”21 This approach excludes the broad range of potential threats to a
country’s national security that target cyber-infrastructure but do not meet the
requirements of a semantic attack. These threats have the same capacity to
inflict harm on computer systems or networks, and thus any definition of cyberattack that excludes them is necessarily incomplete.
There have been two particularly prominent government-led efforts to
understand the scope of the threat posed by cyber-attacks, one by the U.S.
government and the other by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization—a
security cooperation group composed of China, Russia, and most of the former
Soviet Central Asian republics, as well as observers including Iran, India, and
Pakistan. Perhaps not surprisingly, they have arrived at very different
understandings of the problem.
Shortly after establishing the United States Cyber Command, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff published a lexicon in 2011 for military use in cyber-operations,
which included the first official military definition of cyber-attack. It defines a
cyber-attack as:
A hostile act using computer or related networks or systems, and
intended to disrupt and/or destroy an adversary’s critical cyber
systems, assets, or functions. The intended effects of cyber attack are
not necessarily limited to the targeted computer systems or data
themselves—for instance, attacks on computer systems which are
intended to degrade or destroy infrastructure or C2 capability. A cyber
attack may use intermediate delivery vehicles including peripheral
devices, electronic transmitters, embedded code, or human operators.
The activation or effect of a cyber attack may be widely separated
temporally and geographically from the delivery.22
A key feature of this approach is that it limits “cyber-attacks” to those hostile
acts that are intended to harm critical cyber systems—thus restricting the
definition based on the objective of the attack.23
21. MARTIN C. LIBICKI, WHAT IS INFORMATION WARFARE? 77 (1995).
22. Gen. James E. Cartwright, Memorandum for Chiefs of the Military Servs., Commanders of
the Combatant Commands, Dirs. of the Joint Staff Directories on Joint Terminology for Cyberspace
Operations 5 (Nov. 2011).
23. Alternative views of cyber-attack and cyber-warfare preceded this announcement in policy
circles in the United States. In 2001, the Congressional Research Service defined cyber-warfare as
“warfare waged in cyberspace. It can include defending information and computer networks, deterring
information attacks, as well as denying an adversary’s ability to do the same. It can include offensive
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The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, by contrast, has adopted a more
expansive means-based approach to cyber-attacks. The Organization has
“express[ed] concern about the threats posed by possible use of [new
information and communication] technologies and means for the purposes [sic]
incompatible with ensuring international security and stability in both civil and
military spheres.”24 It defines an “information war” as “mass psychologic[al]
brainwashing to destabilize society and state, as well as to force the state to
take decisions in the interest of an opposing party.”25 Moreover, it identifies the
dissemination of information harmful to “social and political, social and
economic systems, as well as spiritual, moral and cultural spheres of other
states” as one of the main threats to information security.26
Hence the Shanghai Cooperation Organization appears to have adopted an
expansive vision of cyber-attacks that includes the use of cyber-technology to
undermine political stability. Commentators fear that this definition represents
an effort to justify censorship of political speech on the Internet.27 This concern
is particularly salient in light of recent government efforts to suppress political
organizing using new media in Iran, Egypt, and elsewhere.28As the Internet is
increasingly utilized as a forum for exchange of ideas and political
organization, such suppression threatens human rights.

information operations mounted against an adversary, or even dominating information on the
battlefield.” STEVEN A. HILDRETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS:
CYBERWARFARE 16 (2001). In 2009, the U.S. National Research Council, an independent organization
in Washington, D.C., defined cyber-attack as “deliberate actions to alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or
destroy computer systems or networks or the information and/or programs resident in or transiting
these systems or networks.” NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 1 (William A. Owens et al.
eds., 2009) [hereinafter NRC REPORT].
24. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE SHANGHAI
COOPERATION ORGANIZATION ON COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION
SECURITY, 61ST PLENARY MEETING (Dec. 2, 2008) [hereinafter SHANGHAI COOPERATION
AGREEMENT]. The distinction between this interpretation and that of the United States is
understandable in light of Matthew Waxman’s analysis of strategic differences in the cyber-attack
context. As Waxman notes, “major state actors in this area are likely to have different views on legal
line drawing because they perceive a different set of strategic risks and opportunities.” Matthew C.
Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the Future of Article 2(4), 36 YALE J. INT’L L.
421, 458–59 (2011).
25. SHANGHAI COOPERATION AGREEMENT, Annex I, at 209.
26. Id. at 203.
27. See, e.g., Tom Gjelten, Seeing the Internet as an ‘Information Weapon,’ NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130052701; see also
infra Part I.A.2.e.
28. See, e.g., Saeed Kamali Dehghan, Iran Clamps Down on Internet Use, GUARDIAN (Jan. 5,
2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/05/iran-clamps-down-internet-use; Matt Richtel,
Egypt Halts Most Internet and Cell Service, and Scale of Shutdown Surprises Experts, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 29, 2011, at A13; Sal Gentile, Gadhafi Regime “Turns Off the Tap” on Libya’s Internet, Live
Blog: Libya Revolts, PBS (Mar. 4, 2011, 6:46 PM), http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-know/the-dailyneed/libya-revolts-a-live-blog/7679/.
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The distance between these two government-led understandings of cyberattacks demonstrates the importance of specifying a clear definition of the
problem to be faced. The next Subsection takes on this task.
2. Recommended Definition
In this Article, we adopt a narrow definition of cyber-attack, one meant to
focus attention on the unique threat posed by cyber-technologies:
A cyber-attack consists of any action taken to undermine the functions
of a computer network for a political or national security purpose.
This Subsection discusses each aspect of this definition to explain the reasoning
behind the language and to clarify which activities it encompasses.
a. “A cyber-attack . . .”
Implicit in this term is the requirement that the conduct must be active:
either offense or active defense.29 Active defense includes “electronic
countermeasures designed to strike attacking computer systems and shut down
cyber-attacks midstream.”30 Governments are likely to employ both active and
passive defenses—and the two are often designed to work in tandem31—but the
passive defense cannot on its own amount to a cyber-attack.32
b. “. . . consists of any action taken . . .”
A cyber-attack may be carried out by means of any action—hacking,
bombing, cutting, infecting, and so forth—but to be a cyber-attack it must aim
to undermine or disrupt the function of a computer network. In this respect, this
Article adopts the U.S. objective-based approach rather than the means-based
approach of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
Warfare may be classified on the basis of the means of attack. For
example, warfare may be classified as kinetic (conventional, physical) warfare,
biological warfare, chemical warfare, nuclear warfare, intelligence-based
warfare, network-based warfare,33 or guerilla warfare. Warfare may also be

29. Measures of passive defense against cyber-attacks, such as virus scanning software or
firewalls, are outside the scope of this definition.
30. JEFFREY CARR, INSIDE CYBER WARFARE 46 (2010).
31. Active defense may be triggered by passive activities. For example, a routine virus scan
that identifies a virus and then eliminates it switches from passive (scanning) to active (elimination).
32. The U.S. government currently utilizes both active and passive defenses. See U.S. DEP’T
OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN CYBERSPACE (2011) [hereinafter
DOD STRATEGY].
33. This is distinct from “network warfare,” which is defined as “the employment of Computer
Network Operations (CNO) with the intent of denying adversaries the effective use of their computers,
information systems, and networks, while ensuring the effective use of our own computers,
information systems, and networks.” NRC REPORT, supra note 23, at 165. Network-based warfare is
any type of warfare that utilizes networks. Note a similar distinction between intelligence-based
warfare (which describes the means) and information warfare (which describes the objective).
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defined by its objective. “Objective” here means the direct target, rather than
the long-range purpose, of the action. Examples include information warfare,
psychological warfare, command and control warfare,34 electronic warfare, and
economic warfare.
Because we define cyber-attack according to its objective (“to undermine
the functions of a computer network for a political or national security
purpose”), any means may be used to accomplish a cyber-attack. Defining
cyber-attack by objective rather than means is superior for three reasons.
First, and most important, this type of definition is simply more intuitive.
Using a computer network in Nevada to operate a predator drone for a kinetic
attack in Pakistan is not a cyber-attack; rather, it is technologically advanced
conventional warfare. Using a regular explosive to sever the undersea network
cables that carry the information packets between continents, on the other hand,
is a cyber-attack.35 This view is consistent with that offered by the U.S.
Department of Defense, which has identified kinetic attack as a strategy in
cyber-offensive operations.36
Second, the objective-based approach is logical. Warfare traditionally
functions in four domains—land, air, sea, and space—each of which is
addressed by one of the full-time armed services.37 With the rise of cyberwarfare, strategists have identified a fifth domain: cyberspace.38 In response,
the United States has created the U.S. Cyber Command, a subdivision of the
joint services Strategic Command.39 Although the Cyber Command is not a
34. “Command and control warfare” includes any attack meant to interfere with the enemy’s
capacity to command and control its troops. See GEORGE J. STEIN, INFORMATION ATTACK:
INFORMATION WARFARE IN 2025, at 2 (1996), available at http://csat.au.af.mil/2025/volume3/vol3
ch03.pdf. The Department of Defense defines command and control as
[t]he exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned
and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions
are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities,
and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and
controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.
Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint
Chiefs of Staff (Nov. 2010), available at http://www.dtic.mil/ doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.
35. See Antolin-Jenkins, supra note 11, at 138 (“[K]inetic weapons are certainly part of the
cyberwar arsenal.”).
36. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, NATIONAL
MILITARY STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS 15 (2006). A National Research Council report
on “cyber offensive operations” excluded kinetic attacks on computer networks for the purposes of the
report, but acknowledged that such attacks were realistic forms of cyber-attack. NRC REPORT, supra
note 23, at 12–19.
37. Space is difficult to assign to the Army, Navy, or Air Force, but its proper classification is
outside the scope of this paper.
38. See DOD STRATEGY, supra note 32, at 5; War in the Fifth Domain, ECONOMIST (July 1,
2010), http://www.economist.com/node/16478792. The Joint Chiefs of Staff identify cyberspace as
one of the “global commons,” along with international waters, air space, and space. JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF, NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 5 (2004).
39. William H. McMichael, DoD Cyber Command Is Officially Online, ARMYTIMES (May
22, 2010, 9:20 AM), http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/05/military_cyber_command_052110/;
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unique service, it coordinates the functional operations of the Army, Navy (and
Marines), and Air Force. The armed services are traditionally organized by
domain rather than by platform. The Army’s function is to control land, not to
drive tanks and fire land-based artillery; the Navy’s function is to control the
seas, not to operate boats and ships; and the Air Force’s function is to control
the skies, not to fly planes and drop bombs. Each service has access to
whatever tools and weapons it deems necessary to control its domain: planes,
boats, missiles, artillery, computer networks, and so forth. By the same logic,
Cyber Command’s mission is not to utilize computer networks for any
objective, but to defend the ability to operate in cyberspace by any means.40
Third, an objective-based approach avoids unnecessarily limiting Internet
speech, thereby avoiding the serious risks posed by a means-based definition.
By encompassing any activity that uses cyber-technology and jeopardizes
stability, a means-based understanding of cyber-warfare can be used to
constrain the expression of free speech and political dissent online.41 The
Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s definition may have been designed to be
means-based in part for this reason.42
c. “. . . to undermine the function . . .”
The objective of a cyber-attack must be to undermine the function of a
computer network. A computer network may be compromised in many
different ways. Syntactic attacks disrupt a computer’s operating system,
causing the network to malfunction.43 Examples include “worms, viruses, [and]
Trojan horses.”44 The incident in Burma, discussed in the opening to this
Article, constituted a syntactic attack. In contrast, semantic attacks preserve the
operating system but compromise the accuracy of the information it processes
and to which it reacts.45 As a result, “[a] system under semantic attack operates
and will be perceived as operating correctly, . . . but it will generate answers at
variance with reality.”46 The Stuxnet attack described above was, in part, a
semantic attack because the nuclear plant appeared to be operating normally
even as it was malfunctioning.47

see Thom Shanker, Cyberwar Chief Calls for Secure Computer Network, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2010,
at A1.
40. See DOD STRATEGY, supra note 32, at 5 (“[T]reating cyberspace as a domain is a critical
organizing concept for DoD’s national security missions. This allows DoD to organize, train, and
equip for cyberspace as we do in air, land, maritime, and space to support national security interests.”).
41. See Gjelten, supra note 27.
42. See id.; SHANGHAI COOPERATION AGREEMENT, supra note 24.
43. Antolin-Jenkins, supra note 11, at 139.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 140.
46. LIBICKI, supra note 21, at 77.
47. Cyber-attacks need not be limited to syntactic or semantic attacks. The U.S. cyberoperation in Iraq discussed below, for example, was neither syntactic nor semantic. Nevertheless, it
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By contrast, neither cyber-espionage nor cyber-exploitation constitutes a
cyber-attack because these concepts do not involve altering computer networks
in a way that affects their current or future ability to function.48 For example, in
2003, a security breach created numerous leaks of sensitive information from
U.S. Department of Defense computers, which occurred over several months.49
The Department has acknowledged that the majority of such incidents—
collectively referred to as “Titan Rain”—were orchestrated by China as a
method of cyber-espionage.50 Another recent example of cyber-espionage
occurred when hackers operating from China copied data from Google and
other major Internet technology companies in 2010. The alleged purpose of the
prolonged security breach ranged from theft of intellectual property to unlawful
surveillance of human rights activists.51 Subsequent developments imply that at
least one purpose of the attack—dubbed “Operation Aurora”—was to monitor
U.S. government officials’ emails.52 More recently, the Department of Defense
admitted that it suffered one of its worst cyber-espionage leaks in March 2011,
when foreign hackers gained access to over 24,000 Pentagon files.53
Meanwhile, the extent to which the United States is conducting similar
activities is unknown.54
constitutes a cyber-attack under this Article’s definition, as it did “undermine the function” of the
secure email system by causing it to send an email from an unauthorized user.
48. This Article adopts the following definition of cyber-espionage: “[T]he science of covertly
capturing e-mail traffic, text messages, other electronic communications, and corporate data for the
purpose of gathering national-security or commercial intelligence.” Seymour M. Hersh, The Online
Threat: Should We Be Worried About a Cyber War? NEW YORKER (Nov. 1, 2010),
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/11/01/101101fa_fact_hersh?. The former director of the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) emphasizes that cyber-espionage does not fall under the umbrella
of cyber-warfare, likely because the U.S. government—like many other governments—routinely
engages in espionage over communications networks. Gjelten, supra note 18. Notably, the National
Research Council draws a similar line. It distinguishes what it calls cyber-exploitation—which
includes actions that merely gather information from the cyber-domain and is therefore related to, if
perhaps somewhat broader than, cyber-espionage—from cyber-attack because “[t]he [law of armed
conflict] presumes that a clear distinction can be drawn between the use of force and espionage, where
espionage is avowedly not a use of force.” NRC REPORT, supra note 23, at 22, § 1.6.
49. CLAY WILSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., BOTNETS, CYBERCRIME, AND
CYBERTERRORISM: VULNERABILITIES AND POLICY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 14 (2008).
50. Id.
51. A New Approach to China, OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Jan. 12, 2010, 3:00 PM),
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html; see also James Glanz & John
Markoff, State’s Secrets Day 7; Vast Hacking by a China Fearful of the Web, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4,
2010, at A1.
52. See, e.g., Amir Efrati & Siobhan Gorman, Google Mail Hack Is Blamed on China, WALL
ST. J., June 2, 2011, at A1; Wyatt Andrews, China Google Hacker’s Goal: Spying on U.S. Govt, CBS
NEWS (June 2, 2011), http://m.cbsnews.com/fullstory.rbml?catid=20068474&feed_id=0&
videofeed=36 (last visited Apr. 19, 2012).
53. Thom Shanker & Elisabeth Bumiller, After Suffering Damaging Cyberattack, the
Pentagon Takes Defensive Action, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2011, at A6.
54. See Jack Goldsmith, What Is the Government’s Strategy for the Cyber-Exploitation
Threat?, LAWFARE BLOG (Aug. 10, 2011, 10:58 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/08/what-isthe-government%E2%80%99s-strategy-for-the-cyber-exploitation-threat/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2012).
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Although all of these incidents of cyber-espionage compromised the
security of a computer network for the purpose of carrying out a military
objective,55 they did not “undermine the function” of a computer system and
thus were not cyber-attacks as defined here. To “undermine the function” of a
computer system, an actor must do more than passively observe a computer
network or copy data, even if that observation is clandestine. The actor must
affect the operation of the system either by damaging the operating system or
by adding false, misleading, or unwelcome information. Such activities may be
criminal—as acts of corporate or political cyber-espionage—but they are not
cyber-attacks. In this respect, our definition reflects a common distinction
between espionage and attacks in more traditional settings.
d. “. . . of a computer network . . .”
A cyber-attack must target a computer network, where a computer
network is defined as a system of computers and devices connected by
communications channels. Frequently, this connection exists over the Internet,
but there are also numerous closed networks, such as the secure networks
employed by agencies of the U.S. government.
It is important to bear in mind that computers are now everywhere. The
concept of a computer encompasses more than a simple desktop or laptop; it
also includes the devices that control elevators and traffic lights, regulate
pressure on water mains, and are ubiquitous in appliances such as cell phones,
televisions, and even washing machines.56 The potential for widespread
damage from a cyber-attack grows in tandem with the spread of computers to
nearly every facet of human activity.
e. “. . . for a political or national security purpose.”
A political or national security purpose distinguishes cyber-attack from
simple cyber-crime. Any aggressive action taken by a state actor in the cyberdomain necessarily implicates national security and is therefore a cyber-attack
(where the action satisfies all the other elements of the definition), whether or
not it rises to the level of cyber-warfare. A cyber-crime committed by a non–
state actor for a political or national security purpose is a cyber-attack. On the
other hand, a cyber-crime that is not carried out for a political or national
security purpose, such as most instances of Internet fraud, identity theft, and
intellectual property piracy, does not fit this final element of a “cyber-attack”
and is therefore mere cyber-crime.

55. See Michael Joseph Gross, Enter the Cyber-Dragon, VANITY FAIR, Sept. 2011, available
at http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/features/2011/09/chinese-hacking-201109 (detailing these and
other successful hacks of public and private systems).
56. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 7, at 70–74.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2134932

02-Hathaway (Do Not Delete)

2012]

7/6/2012 12:47:17 AM

THE LAW OF CYBER-ATTACK

831

There are at least two important reasons for excluding nonpolitical cybercrimes (that is, cyber-crimes not carried out for a political or national security
purpose) from the definition of cyber-attack. First, such activities, while
troubling, do not raise the same legal questions as activities that might breach
public international law. The actions of the Kremlin Kids, private hackers who
allegedly shut down the Georgian Internet during Russia’s invasion of South
Ossetia,57 invoke legal doctrines surrounding state responsibility and
terrorism58 in a way that the actions of Onel de Guzman, a student who was
suspected of infecting tens of millions of computers in 2000 with the
destructive but undirected “love bug virus,”59 do not. Second, a cleaner
delineation between cyber-attacks that present threats to national security and
purely private cyber-crime will clarify ownership of cyber-security needs
among various government departments.
A political or national security purpose also denotes the public nature of
the cyber-attacks without limiting the definition to state actors. This is
important because, due to their low cost and the relative invulnerability of non–
state actors to in-kind retribution, cyber-attacks are a particularly attractive
weapon for terrorists and other non–state actors.60 Because non–state actors
may execute or may be the victim of cyber-attacks, the purpose, rather than the
actor, must distinguish a cyber-attack from a simple cyber-crime. This
definition does not distinguish between state and non–state actors. Rather, it
identifies a legal framework that is compatible with existing law of war and
international law distinctions between non–state and state actors.
Although this distinction is notable, it is not without risks. There is always
a danger that cyber-regulations may be applied against individuals using
technology for legitimate political dissent, which necessarily has a political
purpose. While the First Amendment protects dissent in the United States, the
use of cyberspace regulations to suppress dissent is a serious possibility in

57. See Noah Shachtman, Kremlin Kids: We Launched the Estonian Cyber War, WIRED (Mar.
11, 2009, 12:45 PM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/03/pro-kremlin-gro/ (last visited Apr.
19, 2012); infra Part I.B.1.
58. The line drawn between simple cyber-crime and cyber-attack by private individuals is
analogous to the line drawn between violent crime and terrorism. See 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(B) (2006)
(defining international terrorism according to its apparent political intentions); BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1611 (9th ed. 2009) (defining terrorism as using violence “as a means of affecting
political conduct”).
59. Mark Landler, A Filipino Linked to ‘Love Bug’ Talks About His License to Hack, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 21, 2000, at C1.
60. See NRC REPORT, supra note 23, at 20, §1.4 (on low cost); id. at 41 (on limited
applicability of deterrence by threat of in-kind response); DOD STRATEGY, supra note 32, at 3
(discussing the power of small groups to cause significant harm due to the low barriers to entry for
cyber-activity); Shanker & Bumiller, supra note 53 (noting that while most major efforts to penetrate
military computer networks are still orchestrated by large rival nations, the technical expertise is
certain to migrate to rogue states and non–state actors).
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countries that do not have the same liberal democratic traditions.61 Internet
regulations in China are a troubling testament to this fact.62 As a foreign policy
matter, the United States must ensure that any proposed domestic legislation
(which may serve as a model for other countries) or international regime
(which may be susceptible to multiple readings) clearly maintains online space
for legitimate dissent while strengthening the legal tools to combat and punish
cyber-attacks.63 This definition seeks to keep legitimate dissent out of the
category of cyber-attack by specifying that a cyber-attack’s objective must be
to undermine the function of a computer network. It would not include, for
example, computer-based efforts to organize political protests.
The definition offered here adopts the objective-based approach taken by
the U.S. government, but it adds a “purpose” requirement that enables policymakers to distinguish between mere cyber-crime and cyber-attacks. Such a
distinction is crucial to domestic and international efforts to implement cybersecurity, because it more effectively tailors the legal approach to the threat
posed and focuses resources on true national security threats.
3. Cyber-Attack, Cyber-Crime, and Cyber-Warfare Compared
We summarize our definition of “cyber-attack” and the distinctions
between “cyber-attack,” “cyber-crime,” and “cyber-warfare” in Table 1 and
Figure 1.

61. See, e.g., Gjelten, supra note 27 (on Chinese and Russian efforts to control communication
on the Internet).
62. China has also been embroiled in cyber-conflict with private entities as well—namely,
Google and Yahoo. Since the early 2000s, the U.S.-based companies have been criticized for their
cooperation with the Chinese government, both in policing internal dissidents and in censoring
external information of a political nature. See Yahoo ‘Helped Jail China Writer,’ BBC NEWS (Sept. 7,
2005, 8:18 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4221538.stm; Google Censors Itself for China, BBC
NEWS (Jan. 25, 2006, 8:45 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4645596.stm. Pressure from
the Chinese government for such cooperation comes in response to activity it labels as “cyberattacks”—the dissemination of information that undermines civil and military stability. See SHANGHAI
COOPERATION AGREEMENT, supra note 24.
63. The White House’s recent strategy paper on cyberspace addresses the danger that efforts to
reduce cyber-attacks could stifle free speech. It notes that “the ability to seek, receive, and impart
information and ideas through any medium and regardless of frontiers has never been more relevant”
and urges that “exceptions to free speech in cyberspace must also be narrowly tailored.” OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE: PROSPERITY, SECURITY, AND
OPENNESS IN A NETWORKED WORLD 5 (2011) [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE CYBERSPACE STRATEGY].
Protecting fundamental freedoms and privacy is one of the White House’s seven high-level policy
priorities for cyberspace, id. at 23–24, and one of the three law enforcement policy priorities is to
“[f]ocus cybercrime laws on combating illegal activities, not restricting access to the internet,” id. at
20.
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TABLE 1: Essential characteristics of different cyber-actions

Involves only non–state actors
Must be violation of criminal law, committed
by means of a computer system
Objective must be to undermine the function
of a computer network
Must have a political or national security
purpose
Effects must be equivalent to an “armed
attack,” or activity must occur in the
context of armed conflict

Type of cyber-action
CyberCyberCybercrime
attack
warfare
√
√
√

√

√

√
√

FIGURE 1: Relationship between cyber-actions

Cyberwarfare
Cyber-crime

Cyber-attack

In order to understand cyber-attack, it is important to appreciate the
distinctions between cyber-attack and cyber-crime. Cyber-crime is a broad
concept analytically distinct from cyber-attack. While, as with the concept of
cyber-attack, there is no universally recognized definition of cyber-crime,64

64. See, e.g., Sarah Gordon & Richard Ford, On the Definition and Classification of
Cybercrime, 2 J. COMPUTER VIROLOGY 13, 13 (2006) (“Despite the fact that the word ‘Cybercrime’
has entered into common usage, many people would find it hard to define the term precisely.”); Sylvia
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there are aspects of cyber-crime that are broadly recognized. In particular,
cyber-crime is generally understood as the use of a computer-based means to
commit an illegal act. One typical definition describes cyber-crime as “any
crime that is facilitated or committed using a computer, network, or hardware
device.”65 Cyber-crime, unlike the definition of cyber-attack proposed in this
Article, is thus often defined by its means—that is, a computer system or
network. As such, cyber-crime encompasses a very broad range of illicit
activity. Among the priorities of the Department of Justice and FBI units
addressing cyber-crime are fraudulent practices on the Internet, online piracy,
storage and sharing of child pornography on a computer, and computer
intrusions.66 Unlike cyber-attacks, cyber-crimes need not undermine the target
computer network (though in some cases they may do so), and most do not
have a political or national security purpose. Finally, like all crimes, but unlike
cyber-attacks, cyber-crimes are generally understood to be committed by
individuals, not states.67 While the distinction between cyber-crime and cyberattack is important, we acknowledge that it often will not be readily apparent at
the moment of the cyber-event whether it is one or the other (or both)—in part
because the identity and purpose of the actor may not be apparent. Such
uncertainty counsels in favor of an immediate response that would be
appropriate to either cyber-crime or a cyber-attack.
Most cyber-crimes do not also constitute cyber-attack or cyber-warfare, as
depicted in Figure 1. An act is only a cyber-crime when a non–state actor
commits an act that is criminalized under domestic or international law.

Mercado Kierkegaard, International Cybercrime Convention, IGI GLOBAL, http://www.igiglobal.com/viewtitlesample.aspx?id=7486 (last visited Apr. 6, 2012) (“[T]here is still no accepted
definition of what really constitutes cybercrime.”); see also DEBRA LITTLEJOHN SHINDER, SCENE OF
THE CYBERCRIME: COMPUTER FORENSICS HANDBOOK 16 (Ed Tittel ed., 2002) (“[T]he definition of
computer crime under state law differs, depending on the state.”).
65. Gordon & Ford, supra note 64, at 14. In addition, some proposed definitions are broad
enough to include not only all crimes committed by means of a computer, but also any crime in any
way involving a computer as a means or a target. See, e.g., SHINDER, supra note 64, at 17 (referring to
the Tenth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders’ broad
definition of “computer-related crime,” as compared to its narrower, means-based definition of
“computer crime”).
66. See generally COMPUTER CRIME AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SECTION, CRIMINAL
DIVISION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES (2d ed. 2010); Cyber Crime,
FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/cyber (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). The Council of Europe
Convention on Cybercrime, similarly, covers a broad range of criminal activity committed by means
of a computer, including “action directed against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of
computer systems, networks and computer data as well as the misuse of such systems, networks and
data.” Convention on Cybercrime, Council of Europe, E.T.S. No. 185, pmbl., Nov. 23, 2001 (entered
into force July 1, 2004), available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/185.htm
[hereinafter Cybercrime Convention].
67. Therefore, under our definition, while public officials may commit cyber-crimes while
acting outside the scope of their authority, the actions of states, even if unlawful, are not considered to
be crimes as such.
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Consider the following three scenarios, each of which includes a cyber-crime
that is not a cyber-attack:
First, a non–state actor commits an illegal act for a political or national
security purpose by means of a computer network but does not undermine that
network. For example, an individual might commit a cyber-crime by expressing
political dissent over the Internet where that dissent is illegal under domestic
law. Similarly, an individual might commit a cyber-crime by hacking into a
major bank’s records with a national security or political purpose but without
undermining the bank’s system in the process.
Second, a non–state actor commits an illegal act by means of a computer
network—and undermines a computer network—but not for a political or
national security purpose. Again consider the bank data hacker, who now
manages to undermine the bank’s online account system but whose only
purpose is economic gain. This, too, would constitute a cyber-crime, but not a
cyber-attack or cyber-warfare.
Third, a non–state actor is engaged in illicit activity using a computer or
network but does not undermine the function of a computer network and does
not operate with a political or national security purpose. A person who transfers
child pornography, for example, would commit a cyber-crime but not a cyberattack, both because the actions do not undermine the function of a computer
network and because he or she is not motivated by a political or national
security purpose.
As shown in Figure 1, just as some cyber-crimes are neither cyber-attacks
nor cyber-warfare, some cyber-attacks are neither cyber-crimes nor cyberwarfare. Two scenarios fall into this cyber-attack-only category. The first
includes attacks carried out by a state actor, outside the context of an armed
conflict, provided its effects do not rise to the level of an armed attack. An
example is the attack by the Chinese government on the Falun Gong website in
2011.68 Note that such attacks must still satisfy all elements of the cyber-attack
definition, including undermining the function of a computer network for a
political or national security purpose. As noted above, however, any act by a
state actor automatically satisfies the political or national security purpose
requirement.
The second cyber-attack-only scenario includes attacks by non–state
actors that do not rise to the level of an armed attack and which do not
constitute a cyber-crime, either because they have not been criminalized under
national or international law or because they do not use computer-based means.
Practically speaking, it is unlikely for a private actor to purposefully69
undermine the function of a computer network without also violating the law,

68. See Nakashima & Wan, supra note 5.
69. Because a cyber-attack must be “for a political or national security purpose,” the only
actions falling into this category would be purposeful.
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but such gaps in the criminal law are conceptually possible. It is furthermore
worth noting that a large majority of cyber-attacks would likely involve
computer-based means, though such means are not necessary to cyber-attack
under the definition proposed here.
While cyber-activity may constitute only cyber-crime or only cyberattack, a substantial proportion of cyber-crimes are also cyber-attacks. The
overlapping area between cyber-crime and cyber-attack seen in Figure 1 occurs
when a non–state actor commits an illegal act by means of a computer network,
undermines a computer network, and has a political or national security
purpose. The consequences of this act would not rise to the level of an armed
attack, or the activity would also constitute cyber-warfare. Note also that a state
committing this very same act would not fall within this overlap, since only a
non–state actor can commit a cyber-crime. Take, for example, a hypothetical
group of individuals who hacked into the U.S. State Department’s server and
shut it down out of disdain for the U.S. government. This instance would fall
within the overlap between cyber-crimes and cyber-attacks given that a non–
state actor committed the act, for a political or national security purpose, and it
undermined a computer network.
Cyber-warfare is distinctive among the three cyber-categories considered
here in that cyber-warfare must also constitute a cyber-attack. The overlapping
area between cyber-attack and cyber-warfare (but not cyber-crimes) in Figure 1
includes two types of attacks. The first type includes attacks carried out by any
actor in the context of an armed conflict, provided those actions could not be
considered cyber-crimes, either because they do not constitute war crimes, or
do not employ computer-based means, or both. The second type includes
attacks carried out by a state actor, which produce effects equivalent to those of
a conventional armed attack. Note that this use of force may be either lawful or
unlawful; because the actor is a state actor, even unlawful actions do not
necessarily constitute “cyber-crime.”
Cyber-warfare can also constitute both cyber-attack and cyber-crime. The
area of intersection between all three circles in Figure 1 includes two types of
attacks carried out by a non–state actor. First, it includes attacks in the context
of an existing armed conflict that undermine the function of a computer
network for a political or national security purpose, violate the criminal law
(for example, war crimes), and were committed by means of a computer system
or network. Second, it includes attacks that produce effects equivalent to those
of a conventional armed attack, undermine the function of a computer network
for a political or national security purpose, and are violations of the criminal
law committed by means of a computer system or network.
As summarized in Table 1 and Figure 1, then, a cyber-attack may be
carried out by state or non–state actors, must involve active conduct, must aim
to undermine the function of a computer network, and must have a political or
national security purpose. Some cyber-attacks are also cyber-crimes, but not all
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cyber-crimes are cyber-attacks. Cyber-warfare, on the other hand, always meets
the conditions of a cyber-attack. But not all cyber-attacks are cyber-warfare.
Only cyber-attacks with effects equivalent to those of a conventional “armed
attack,” or occurring within the context of armed conflict, rise to the level of
cyber-warfare. We say more about when this condition is met in Part II below.
B. Recent Cyber-Attacks
There are a variety of activities that fall within this Article’s definition of
cyber-attacks. The following examples of recent cyber-incidents—though far
from exhaustive—demonstrate the variety and scope of recent cyber-attacks.
They also introduce the wide-ranging challenges to regulating such attacks.
1. Distributed Denial of Service Attacks
Distributed Denial of Service (“DDOS”) attacks have been the most
prevalent form of cyber-attack in recent years. In these attacks, coordinated
botnets—collections of thousands of “zombie” computers hijacked by insidious
viruses—overwhelm servers by systematically visiting designated websites.
The attack in Burma, described above, was a DDOS attack, as was the attack
on a Falun Gong website inadvertently aired on China Central Television.
There are several other recent examples of such attacks—a few of which we
describe here to provide a sense of the varied ways in which such attacks may
be carried out.
After controversially moving a Soviet-era war memorial in April 2007,
the densely wired70 Republic of Estonia suffered a DDOS attack. Such attacks
often cause mere inconvenience, but this one nearly had life threatening
consequences—the emergency line to call for an ambulance or a fire truck was
out of service for an hour.71 Allegedly executed by networks of hackers,72
authorities never officially attributed the attack to a state, but some suspect
Russia’s involvement due to the sophistication and scale of the attack.73
A similar fate befell Georgia in the summer of 2008, when the country
found itself unable to communicate with the outside world over the Internet as
Russian forces invaded South Ossetia.74 Despite early speculation that the
70. Estonia has one of the highest network saturation rates in the world. CLARKE & KNAKE,
supra note 7, at 13.
71. Newly Nasty: Defences Against Cyberwarfare Are Still Rudimentary. That’s Scary,
ECONOMIST (May 24, 2007), http://www.economist.com/node/9228757?story_id=9228757 (last
visited Apr. 19, 2012).
72. Specifically, a youth movement (funded by the Russian government) later claimed
responsibility for the attack. Shachtman, supra note 57.
73. Jeffrey T. G. Kelsey, Note, Hacking into International Humanitarian Law: The Principles
of Distinction and Neutrality in the Age of Cyber Warfare, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1427, 1429 (2008).
74. The Threat from the Internet: Cyberwar: It Is Time for Countries to Start Talking About
Arms Control on the Internet, ECONOMIST (July 1, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/16481504
(last visited Apr. 19, 2012).
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Russian government had planned the incident, it now appears likely that the
government simply stood by as private hackers openly orchestrated the attack.75
Russians are certainly not the only source of DDOS attacks. In July 2009,
a number of government and commercial websites in the United States and
South Korea were shut down by a DDOS attack. Although South Korea quickly
blamed North Korea,76 the United States was more circumspect.77 There remain
some questions about where the attack originated. This serves to illustrate a
common problem for cyber-attacks in general and DDOS attacks in particular:
by enlisting unsuspecting computers from around the world, botnets spin a web
of anonymity around the attacker or attackers, making accurate attribution
uniquely difficult.
2. Planting Inaccurate Information
Another form of cyber-attack is a semantic attack, in which the attacker
surreptitiously inputs inaccurate information in a computer system. More
sophisticated than the DDOS attack, a semantic attack causes the computer
system to appear to operate normally, even as it fails.78
In 1999, for example, the United States developed a plan to feed false
target data into the Serbian air defense command network, inhibiting Serbia’s
ability to target NATO aircraft.79 This attack would have exploited the
increasing reliance on computer networks that characterizes modern warfare. In
the end, NATO forces abandoned the plan due to legal concerns about
collateral damage.80
The Israeli Air Force employed a similar strategy on September 6, 2007
during its air strike against a nuclear facility in Syria. Israeli planes arrived
undetected at their targets because of an earlier cyber-attack that compromised
the Syrian air-defense system. The exact method of attack is unknown, but
Israel apparently fed false messages to the radars, causing them to show clear
skies on the night of the strike.81
Because these cyber-attacks frequently accompany and facilitate
conventional attacks, attribution is less problematic. The difficulty here is in
75. Brian Krebs, Report: Russian Hacker Forums Fueled Georgia Cyber Attacks, WASH.
POST SECURITY FIX BLOG (Oct. 16, 2008, 3:15 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/
2008/10/report_russian_hacker_forums_f.html.
76. Malcolm Moore, North Korea Blamed for Cyber Attack on South Korea, TELEGRAPH
(July 8, 2009), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ asia/southkorea/5778176/North-Koreablamed-for-cyber-attack-on-South-Korea.html.
77. Officials anonymously leaked qualified reports of U.S. suspicions that the attack emerged
in North Korea. U.S. Eyes N. Korea for ‘Massive’ Cyber Attacks, MSNBC.COM (July 9, 2009, 3:31
AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31789294/ns/technology_and_science-security.
78. LIBICKI, supra note 21, at 77.
79. William M. Arkin, The Cyber Bomb in Yugoslavia, WASH. POST (Oct. 25, 1999),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/dotmil/arkin.htm.
80. Kelsey, supra note 73, at 1434–35.
81. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 7, at 1–9.
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identifying when a cyber-attack has occurred, since the disruption remains
hidden until its kinetic sequel.
3. Infiltrating a Secure Computer Network
Once an attacker infiltrates a secure computer network she can execute a
variety of actions.82 For example, the Stuxnet attack, in addition to being a
semantic attack, targeted the secure computer networks at Iranian nuclear
facilities for the purpose of disrupting the function of the nuclear facility.
Such an attack does not always destroy the computer network or the
infrastructure it controls. In 2003, shortly before the invasion of Iraq, the
United States infiltrated the Iraqi Defense Ministry email system to contact
Iraqi officers with instructions for a peaceful surrender. The messages
apparently worked: American troops encountered abandoned military
equipment arranged in accordance with the email.83 This cyber-attack was a
“Command and Control Attack”—a term that includes any attack meant to
interfere with the enemy’s capacity to command and control its troops.
These incidents demonstrate that attacks need not arrive over the Internet,
but may instead involve infiltrating separate, secure networks. These networks
may include not only desktops and laptops, but the ubiquitous and unseen
computing systems, such as industrial control systems, that facilitate modern
life. Together, these examples also illustrate the growing number of cyberattacks and the diversity of their forms and scope that make the project of
crafting a legal approach to them all the more challenging. The next Part
examines when a cyber-attack rises to the level of “cyber-warfare” governed by
the law of war—and when and how that law allows states to respond to such
attacks.
II.
LAW OF WAR AND “CYBER-WARFARE”
Although the term “cyber-warfare” has become part of common parlance,
few have aimed to examine closely the scope of cyber-activity that might be
governed by the law of war. In this Part, we aim to fill this gap by examining
when a cyber-attack constitutes an armed attack under jus ad bellum and thus
can be accurately considered “cyber-warfare.” We also examine how the laws
governing conduct in the course of war—known as jus in bello—might apply to
cyber-attacks. We do not attempt a detailed application of jus ad bellum and jus
in bello to cyber-attacks, because such inquiries are intensely fact specific.
Instead, we lay out the general types of cyber-attacks that would be governed

82. For reasons explained above, cyber-espionage—stealing rather than planting
information—is not included in most definitions of cyber-attack. See supra text accompanying notes
43–46.
83. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 7, at 9–10.
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by the law of war and note how an attack’s cyber-based nature complicates the
traditional law of war analysis. We conclude that while the law of war provides
useful guidelines for addressing some of the most dangerous forms of cyberattack, the law of war framework ultimately addresses only a small slice of the
full range of cyber-attacks.84 Cyber-warfare is only a part of a much larger
problem.
It is worth noting at the outset that applying the existing law of war
framework to cyber-attacks is extraordinarily challenging. The key treaties
governing conduct in war, the Geneva Conventions, were last revised in the
wake of World War II. Nothing was further from the minds of the drafters of
the Geneva Conventions than attacks carried out over a worldwide computer
network. One unanticipated challenge is how to address attacks that have little
or no direct physical consequences, but that nonetheless cause real harm to
national security. Perhaps for this reason, thus far no state has claimed that a
cyber-attack constitutes an “armed attack” giving rise to a right of self-defense
under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Nor has any state argued that cyberattacks generally constitute a prohibited use of force. The fact that such attacks
are increasing in number and scope, however, suggests that there is a growing
need for states to reach a consensus as to when a cyber-attack constitutes an
armed attack or use of force. In the absence of agreement, the increase in
attacks heightens the possibility that states might respond to a cyber-attack with
conventional military means.85 The rise in attacks also creates a more pressing
need for a more comprehensive legal framework to regulate activities—such as
those causing widespread economic damage—that would not be governed by
the law of war.86

84. Practitioners and scholars are divided on how easily the law of war can be applied to
cyber-attacks. The Handbook guiding Navy, Marine, and Coast Guard operations, discussing
information operations, states that “[l]egal analysis of intended wartime targets requires traditional law
of war analysis.” DEP’T OF THE NAVY, COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS, § 8.11.1 (2007) [hereinafter COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK]. Some scholars argue that
“[t]he law of war targeting principles of military necessity, proportionality, and unnecessary suffering
govern all uses of force, whatever means employed.” Sean Watts, Combatant Status and Computer
Network Attack, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 391, 425 (2010); see also Michael N. Schmitt, Wired Warfare:
Computer Network Attack and the Jus in Bello, in COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 187, 195 (Michael N. Schmitt & Brian T. O’Donnell eds., 2002) (arguing that
existing norms remain intact, although a computer network attack offers new means to target
nonmilitary objectives); Eric Talbot Jensen, Unexpected Consequences from Knock-On Effects: A
Different Standard for Computer Network Operations?, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1145 (2003)
(arguing that no new legal framework is necessary).
85. This is not mere speculation. The Department of Defense issued a report in late 2011 in
which it declared that the United States reserves the right to respond to cyber-attacks using “all
necessary means—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic.” DEP’T OF DEFENSE,
CYBERSPACE POLICY REPORT: A REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011, SECTION 934, at 2 (2011).
86. Others argue that the law of war as it currently stands is insufficient and in need of revision
in light of cyber-attacks. See Hollis, supra note 10, at 1027–28; Davis Brown, A Proposal for an
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We turn first to the most vital question under jus ad bellum—when would
a cyber-attack rise to the level of an armed attack justifying self-defense under
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter? As indicated in Table 1 above, we conclude that
the best test of when a cyber-attack is properly considered cyber-warfare is
whether the attack results in physical destruction—sometimes called a “kinetic
effect”—comparable to a conventional attack. Arriving at this conclusion
requires examining not only the Charter’s text—which is quite general and
vague—but also the meaning given to that text by state practice and
interpretation over time. Because an armed conflict has never begun solely as a
result of a cyber-attack, there is no state practice on what cyber-attacks justify
an armed response. Accordingly, the legal analysis here is necessarily
speculative.
We turn next to applying the law of war once armed conflict has
commenced, or jus in bello, to cyber-warfare. This body of law is less
speculative, as there have been documented incidents of cyber-attacks in the
context of an armed conflict. Even so, it is challenging to apply even widely
accepted core jus in bello principles of proportionality and distinction to cyberwarfare. These challenges illustrate the importance of commencing an
international dialogue on these issues to bring clarity to existing law of war
principles in this context. They also demonstrate that the law of war alone
cannot address the new challenges posed by cyber-attacks.
A. Jus ad Bellum
What law governs states’ right to resort to armed force in self-defense
against cyber-attacks? To answer this question, we proceed in three steps. First,
we outline the general prohibition on the use or threat of force in international
relations contained in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. Second, we discuss the
exceptions to that prohibition for collective security operations and selfdefense, paying particular attention to when a cyber-attack would justify resort
to self-defense. Finally, we close by explaining the customary international law
requirements of jus ad bellum necessity and proportionality and by detailing the
limitations and problems of applying jus ad bellum requirements to cyberattacks. We conclude that states may only use defensive armed force in
response to a cyber-attack if the effects of the attack are equivalent to those of a
conventional armed attack.
1. Governing Legal Principles: Prohibition on Use of Force and Intervention in
Internal Affairs
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter provides that member states “shall refrain
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
International Convention to Regulate the Use of Information Systems in Armed Conflict, 47 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 179 (2006).
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territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”87 This
prohibition is complemented by a customary international law norm of
nonintervention, which prohibits states from interfering in the internal affairs of
other states.88 The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) has held that, where
the interference takes the form of a use or threat of force, the customary
international law norm of nonintervention is coterminous with Article 2(4).89
The precise scope of the international prohibition on the threat or use of
force has been the subject of intense international and scholarly debate. Weaker
states and some scholars have argued that Article 2(4) broadly prohibits not
only the use of armed force, but also political and economic coercion.
Nonetheless, the consensus is that Article 2(4) prohibits only armed force.90
Discussions about cyber-attacks have the potential to reignite debates over
the scope of Article 2(4).91 Because it is much less costly to mount cyberattacks than to launch conventional attacks, and because highly industrialized
states are generally more dependent upon computer networks and are more
vulnerable to cyber-attacks, cyber-attacks may prove to be a powerful weapon
of the weak. This change in the cost structure of offensive capabilities may both
increase the likelihood of cyber-attacks and change the political valence of
different interpretations of Article 2(4)’s scope. Stronger states may begin to
favor more expansive readings of Article 2(4) that prohibit coercive activities
like cyber-attacks.92

87. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
88. See G.A. Res. 37/10, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/10 (Nov. 15, 1982); G.A. Res. 25/2625, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/25/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970).
89. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
14, para. 209 (June 27) (“[A]cts constituting a breach of the customary principle of nonintervention
will also, if they directly or indirectly involve the use of force, constitute a breach of the principle of
non-use of force in international relations.”). It is possible, however, that to the extent cyber-attacks do
not constitute a use of force, they may nevertheless violate the customary international law norm of
nonintervention, as discussed below.
90. Daniel B. Silver, Computer Network Attack as a Use of Force Under Article 2(4) of the
United Nations Charter, in COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 73, 80–82
(Michael N. Schmitt & Brian T. O’Donnell eds., 2002). The principal arguments for the prevailing
view are: (1) that Article 2(4) was conceived against a background of efforts to limit unilateral
recourse to armed force, not economic and political coercion; (2) that the travaux preparatoires show
that the San Francisco Conference rejected a proposal that would have extended Article 2(4) to include
economic sanctions; and (3) that the ICJ has held that financing armed insurrection does not constitute
force, indicating that other economic measures that are even less directly related to armed violence
would not constitute prohibited force either. Id. at 81. There remains some ambiguity, however, as to
the extent to which Article 2(4) prohibits nonmilitary physical force, such as flooding, forest fires, or
pollution. Id. at 82–83.
91. See Waxman, supra note 24.
92. Walter Sharp has advocated that the United States make precisely this kind of strategic
interpretive move, arguing that a broad array of coercive cyber-activities should fall within Article
2(4)’s prohibition. WALTER GARY SHARP, SR., CYBERSPACE AND THE USE OF FORCE 129–33 (1999).
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Cyber-attacks may also violate the customary international law norm of
nonintervention, as defined by a growing record of state practice and opinion
juris. First, states generally do not engage in cyber-attacks openly, but rather try
to hide their responsibility by camouflaging attacks through technical means93
and by perpetrating the attacks through non–state actors with ambiguous
relationships to state agencies.94 As Thomas Franck has observed, “[l]ying
about facts . . . is the tribute scofflaw governments pay to international legal
obligations they violate.”95 In other words, the very fact that states attempt to
hide their cyber-attacks may betray a concern that such attacks may constitute
unlawful uses of force. Second, when states acknowledge that they have been
victims of cyber-attack, they and their allies tend to denounce and condemn the
attacks.96 Third, in its common approach to cyber-defense, NATO has indicated
that cyber-attacks trigger states parties’ obligations under Article 4 of the
NATO treaty,97 which applies only when “the territorial integrity, political
independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”98 The invocation
of this provision strongly suggests that NATO member states believe that
cyber-attacks violate the customary norm of nonintervention or a related
international law norm.99 Still, as the next Subsection explains, the fact that a
cyber-attack is unlawful does not necessarily mean that armed force can be
used in response.
2. Exceptions for Collective Security and Self-Defense
Article 2(4)’s blanket prohibition on the nonconsensual use or threat of
force is subject to two exceptions: actions taken as part of collective security
operations and actions taken in self-defense.
The first exception falls under Article 39 of the U.N. Charter. Article 39
empowers the Security Council to “determine the existence of any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and [to] make
93. See Matthew J. Sklerov, Solving the Dilemma of State Responses to Cyberattacks: A
Justification for the Use of Active Defenses Against States Who Neglect Their Duty to Prevent, 201
MIL. L. REV., Fall 2009, at 1, 74–75.
94. See, e.g., CARR, supra note 30, at 29 (“Hacking attacks cloaked in nationalism are not only
not prosecuted by Russian authorities, but they are encouraged through their proxies, the Russian
youth associations, and the Foundation for Effective Policy.”).
95. Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy After Kosovo and Iraq, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
USE OF FORCE AT THE TURN OF CENTURIES: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF V.D. DEGAN 69, 73 (Vesna
Crnić-Grotić & Miomir Matulović eds., 2005).
96. See, e.g., Ian Traynor, Russia Accused of Unleashing Cyberwar to Disable Estonia,
GUARDIAN (May 16, 2007), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia
(detailing the reactions by Estonian, EU, and NATO officials to a cyber-attack on Estonia).
97. NATO Agrees Common Approach to Cyber Defence, EURACTIV.COM (Apr. 4, 2008),
http://www.euractiv.com/en/infosociety/nato-agrees-common-approach-cyber-defence/article-171377.
98. North Atlantic Treaty, art. 4, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243.
99. As noted below, however, NATO does not believe that cyber-attacks rise to the level of
armed attacks justifying self defense. See NATO Agrees Common Approach to Cyber Defence, supra
note 97; infra Part II.A.2.
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recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken . . . to maintain or
restore international peace and security.”100 The Security Council may employ
“measures not involving the use of armed force”101 and authorize “action by
air, sea, or land forces.”102 Collective security operations under Article 39 can
be politically difficult, however, because they require authorization by the often
deadlocked or slow-moving Security Council.
The second exception to Article 2(4) is codified in Article 51, which
provides that “[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs.”103 Lawful selfdefense can be harder to define and identify than lawful collective security
operations. Indeed, in many armed conflicts, both sides claim to be acting in
self-defense, and the international debates tend to focus on factual and political
disputes rather than legal doctrine.104 It is clear, however, that the critical
question determining the lawfulness of self-defense is whether or not an armed
attack has occurred. A cyber-attack must rise to the level of an armed attack for
a state to respond lawfully under Article 51.105
The term “armed attack” is linguistically distinct from several other
related terms in the U.N. Charter and has been interpreted to be substantively
narrower than them.106 For example, there may be acts that violate Article
2(4)’s prohibition on the use or threat of force that do not rise to the level of an
armed attack, and hence do not trigger the right of self-defense under Article
51. The ICJ has indicated that cross-border incursions that are minor in their
“scale and effects” may be classified as mere “frontier incident[s]” rather than
“armed attacks.”107 Instead, to qualify as armed attacks sufficient to justify a

100. U.N. Charter art. 39.
101. Id. art. 41.
102. Id. art. 42.
103. Id. art. 51. For example, the White House’s recent cyberspace strategy paper includes the
right of self-defense as one of the norms that should guide conduct in cyberspace. WHITE HOUSE
CYBERSPACE STRATEGY, supra note 63, at 10.
104. CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 95–96 (2d ed. 2004).
105. See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE CYBERSPACE STRATEGY, supra note 63, at 14 (“When
warranted, the United States will respond to hostile acts in cyberspace as we would to any other threat
to our country. All states possess an inherent right to self-defense, and we recognize that certain hostile
acts conducted through cyberspace could compel actions under the commitments we have with our
military treaty partners.”).
106. See Yoram Dinstein, Computer Network Attacks and Self-Defense, in COMPUTER
NETWORK ATTACK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 99, 100–01 (Michael N. Schmitt & Brian T.
O’Donnell eds., 2002).
107. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
14, ¶ 195 (June 27); cf. Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 29/3314, Annex, art. 2, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/29/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974) [hereinafter Definition of Aggression] (determining that “[t]he first
use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence of
an act of aggression although the Security Council may . . . conclude that a determination that an act of
aggression has been committed would not be justified in the light of other relevant circumstances,
including the fact that the acts concerned or their consequences are not of sufficient gravity” (emphasis
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response under Article 51, attacks must constitute “most grave forms of the use
of force.”108 Where they may not resort to defensive force under Article 51
(because an attack does not rise to the level of an “armed attack”), states may
be permitted to respond with retorsions or nonforceful countermeasures within
carefully proscribed legal limits.109 As described in more detail in Part III.A,
such countermeasures might include responses in cyberspace.110
In scholarly debates over the application of jus ad bellum to cyber-attacks,
three leading views have emerged to determine when a cyber-attack constitutes
an armed attack that triggers the right of armed self-defense: the instrumentbased approach, the target-based approach, and our preferred approach: the
effects-based approach.111
One scholar has given the moniker “instrument-based” to the classical
approach to the armed attack inquiry.112 Under this view, a cyber-attack alone
will almost never constitute an armed attack for purposes of Article 51
“because it lacks the physical characteristics traditionally associated with
military coercion”—in other words, because it generally does not use
traditional military weapons.113 This approach treats a cyber-attack as an armed

added)). Scholars generally agree that there is a gap between the prohibition on the use of force and the
right of self-defense. See, e.g., Dinstein, supra note 106, at 99, 100–01.
108. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
14, ¶ 191 (June 27).
109. Retorsions are lawful unfriendly acts made in response to an international law violation
by another state; countermeasures are acts that would be unlawful if not done in response to a prior
international law violation. U.N. Int’l Law Comm’n Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., Supp. No. 10,
U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), at 31, 80 [hereinafter Draft Articles]. See infra Part III.A for a more
detailed discussion of countermeasures.
110. See OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, DEP’T OF DEF., AN ASSESSMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ISSUES IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS (1999), reprinted in COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 459, 484–85 [hereinafter DOD MEMO] (Michael N. Schmitt & Brian T.
O’Donnell eds., 2002) (“If the provocation is not considered to be an armed attack, a similar response
will also presumably not be considered to be an armed attack.”).
111. Once a state has been the victim of an armed attack, a further question arises as to against
whom the state can respond. Where the armed attack is perpetrated by a state, this question is easily
answered—self-defense may be directed against the perpetrating state. However, cyber-attacks may be
perpetrated by non–state actors or by actors with unclear affiliations with state security agencies.
Although some scholars argue that cyber-attacks (and conventional attacks) must be attributable to a
perpetrating state in order for the victim state to take defensive action that breaches another state’s
territory, others—drawing on traditional jurisprudence on self-defense—argue that states possess the
right to engage in self-defense directly against non–state actors if certain conditions are met. See
Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones
in Pakistan, 19 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 237, 238–39 (2010) (“The vast majority of writers agree
that an armed attack by a non-state actor on a state, its embassies, its military, or other nationals abroad
can trigger the right of self-defense addressed in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, even if
selective responsive force directed against a non-state actor occurs within a foreign country.”).
112. Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International
Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 909 (1999); see also
Hollis, supra note 10, at 1041.
113. Hollis, supra note 10, at 1041.
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attack only if it uses military weapons. Bombing computer servers or Internet
cables could meet the requirements of an armed attack, for example, if the
strike was of sufficient gravity.
The text of the U.N. Charter provides some support for the instrumentbased approach, since Article 41 characterizes the “complete or partial
interruption of . . . telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication” as a
“measure[] not involving the use of armed force.”114 The U.N. General
Assembly’s Definition of Aggression also implicitly supports the instrumentbased view: it lists a number of acts that would constitute “aggression” under
Article 39—a broader category than armed attack under Article 51—and all of
them involve military weapons or force.115 NATO has also signaled its
agreement with this view; its new common approach to cyber-defense
establishes that a cyber-attack will obligate member states to “consult” with
one another under Article 4 of the NATO treaty, but a cyber-attack will not
constitute an armed attack that obligates member states to assist one another
under Article 5 of the treaty.116
The chief advantage of the instrument-based approach is simplicity of
application, since uses of military weapons and force are relatively easy to
identify. However, because cyber-attacks have the potential to cause
catastrophic harm without employing traditional military weapons, most
scholars have rejected the instrument-based approach to defining armed attacks
as dangerously outdated.
Recognizing the fundamental inability of the instrument-based approach
to account for harms not caused by conventional means, the target-based
approach classifies as an armed attack any cyber-attack that targets a
sufficiently important computer system.117 The primary aim of this approach is
to determine when a cyber-attack portends imminent harm sufficient to justify
the use of anticipatory self-defense in response.118
While the target-based approach has the benefit of allowing for aggressive
protection of critical national systems, it broadly sanctions forceful selfdefense, increasing the likelihood that cyber-conflicts will escalate into more

114. U.N. Charter art. 41.
115. See Definition of Aggression, supra note 107, art. 3.
116. North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 98, arts. 4, 5, 63; NATO Agrees Common Approach to
Cyber Defence, supra note 97.
117. Walter Sharp, the leading proponent of this approach, argues that a cyber-attack
constitutes an armed attack, and would grant the target the right to use force in self-defense whenever
it penetrates any critical national infrastructure system, regardless of whether it has yet caused any
physical destruction or casualties. SHARP, supra note 92, at 129–30; see also Sean M. Condron,
Getting it Right: Protecting American Critical Infrastructure in Cyberspace, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
403, 415-16 (2007) (advocating a similar approach); Eric Talbot Jensen, Computer Attacks on Critical
National Infrastructure: A Use of Force Invoking the Right of Self-Defense, 38 STAN. J. INT’L L. 207,
208–09 (2002) (same).
118. Hollis, supra note 10, at 1041 n.73.
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destructive conventional armed conflicts.119 A cyber-attack need only penetrate
a critical system to justify a conventional military response that could start a
physical, kinetic war. This approach could undermine the security of the
international community by making war much more likely.
Finally, the effects-based approach classifies a cyber-attack as an armed
attack based on the gravity of its effects. Steering a middle course between the
instrument- and target-based views, the effects-based approach is the most
promising and most widely accepted approach. Different versions of the
effects-based approach may measure that gravity by reference to any of a
variety of factors, from the sheer severity of the harm to the length of the causal
chain between the cyber-attack itself and the ultimate harm. But all versions of
this approach share a common orientation towards the inquiry.
The problem with the effects-based approach, however, lies in articulating
ex ante what types of effects justify self-defense.120 Consider, for example, an
attack on an air traffic control system, an attack that disables a regional
electrical power grid, an attack on the New York Stock Exchange or national
financial networks, or the 2007 cyber-attack on prominent Estonian websites.
Which of these cyber-attacks, if any, have effects large enough to be considered
armed attacks justifying the use of defensive force in response? All of these
attacks may cause small- or large-scale civilian deaths and infrastructure
damage, but it would be difficult for the aggressor country to predict the
outcome of any individual attack. Different versions of the effects-based
approach may reach different conclusions for each of these examples.
Professor Michael Schmitt, the best-known proponent of the effects-based
approach for determining when a cyber-attack should be considered an armed
attack, argues that a cyber-attack’s effects should be measured by reference to
six factors: (1) severity: the type and scale of the harm; (2) immediacy: how
quickly the harm materializes after the attack; (3) directness: the length of the
causal chain between the attack and the harm; (4) invasiveness: the degree to
which the attack penetrates the victim state’s territory; (5) measurability: the
degree to which the harm can be quantified; and (6) presumptive legitimacy:
the weight given to the fact that, in the field of cyber-activities as a whole,
cyber-attacks constituting an armed attack are the exception rather than the
rule.121 These factors are illuminating, but they call for such a wide-ranging

119. See Sklerov, supra note 93, at 56 n.352 (criticizing the target-based approach for
encouraging escalation and advocating an effects-based approach).
120. This difficulty is aggravated by the reality that the “indirect effects” of cyber-attacks are
often “more consequential” than the immediate ones. NRC REPORT, supra note 23, at 19.
121. Schmitt, supra note 112, at 914–15; see also Sean P. Kanuck, Recent Development:
Information Warfare: New Challenges for Public International Law, 37 HARV. INT’L L.J. 272, 290
(1996) (“Each suspect activity could be reviewed for its effects on other states, and sanctioned
accordingly.”).
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inquiry that they may not provide sufficient guidance to decision makers.122 In
other words, different analysts applying this version of the effects-based
approach might plausibly classify all or none of the examples listed above as
armed attacks.
Daniel Silver, former General Counsel of the CIA and National Security
Agency, argues instead that the key criterion determining when a cyber-attack
constitutes an armed attack is the severity of the harm caused. A cyber-attack
justifies self-defense “only if its foreseeable consequence is to cause physical
injury or property damage and, even then, only if the severity of those
foreseeable consequences resembles the consequences that are associated with
armed coercion.”123 Under this test, a cyber-attack on the air traffic control
system causing planes to crash would be regarded as an armed attack because it
is foreseeable that such an attack would cause loss of life and substantial
property damage. But a cyber-attack on a website or mere penetration of a
critical computer system generally would not, unless it caused physical injury
or property damage. A cyber-attack on financial systems presents a harder case
for this approach—the analysis would depend on whether the attack was found
to have caused substantial damage to property.
It is important to note that the purpose of the attack is already accounted
for in the definition of cyber-attack recommended herein: the attack must have
been committed for a political or national security purpose. Therefore a cyberattack that has unforeseen national security consequences would not be
considered a cyber-attack, much less cyber-warfare.
This final version of the effects-based approach provides the best balance
between enabling states to adequately respond to catastrophic cyber-attacks and
preventing states from resorting to armed force too easily. The test defines a
small core of harmful cyber-attacks that rise to the level of an armed attack.124
It also focuses the armed attack analysis on a limited set of criteria—
particularly severity and foreseeability.125

122. See Silver, supra note 90, at 89 (claiming that “examination of [Schmitt’s] criteria
suggests that virtually any event of [computer network attack] can be argued to fall on the armed force
side of the line”); see also Jason Barkham, Information Warfare and International Law on the Use of
Force, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 57, 85–86 (2001) (criticizing Schmitt’s use of presumptive
legitimacy as a criterion, as well as Schmitt’s assumption that policy makers will be able to engage in a
thorough factual inquiry when responding to cyber-attacks).
123. Silver, supra note 90, at 90–91.
124. See id. at 92.
125. The Department of Defense has signaled its approval of this approach. See DOD MEMO,
supra note 110, at 483 (arguing “the consequences are likely to be more important than the means
used,” and providing examples of cyber-attacks that would cause civilian deaths and property
damage).
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3. Ad Bellum Necessity and Proportionality
A state’s use of armed force in response to a cyber-attack must not only
conform with U.N. Charter and customary international law limits on the use of
armed force, but it must also comply with the jus ad bellum principles of
necessity and proportionality under customary international law. The principle
of necessity requires that force must be used only as a last resort, when
peaceful means, such as a diplomatic settlement, cannot achieve the state’s
overall aim.126 Proportionality extends this logic, prohibiting force if the overall
scope and intensity of force is excessive in relation to the state’s actual or
imminent danger.127 The United States has acknowledged that these principles
apply to military responses to cyber-attacks.128
While principles of necessity and proportionality are clear, applying those
principles to state responses to cyber-attacks is challenging. Evaluating whether
an invocation of self-defense complies with the principles of necessity and
proportionality is difficult and fact intensive even for conventional attacks, and
cyber-attacks present hard new questions. For example, cyber-attacks rising to
the level of armed attacks may require decision makers to devise ways of
measuring harm to computer networks and its indirect effects against more
conventional kinds of harm in order to determine what would constitute a
lawful response.
Applying the existing jus ad bellum framework in the context of cyberattacks is challenging. Moreover, the framework only applies to the small
subset of cyber-attacks that are addressed by Security Council resolutions or
that constitute an armed attack, giving rise to a right of self-defense under
Article 51. As a result, only a small number of cyber-attacks are properly
considered “cyber-warfare,” to which the laws of war apply. Part III of this
Article explores other international legal regimes that may help to regulate
cyber-attacks that do not fall within these narrow boundaries. First, however,
the following Section describes the legal framework governing cyber-attacks
during an ongoing armed conflict.

126. See, e.g., R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT’L L. 82, 89
(1938) (quoting Secretary of State Daniel Webster’s letter to his British counterpart concerning the
Caroline incident as follows: “It must be shown that admonition or remonstrance to the persons on
board the Caroline was impracticable, or would have been unavailing . . . but that there was a
necessity, present and inevitable, for attacking her . . . .”).
127. See Robert D. Sloane, The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus ad Bellum
and Jus in Bello in the Contemporary Law of War, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 47, 108–09 (2009) (“Ad
bellum proportionality is . . . parasitic on ad bellum necessity. . . . An act is ad bellum disproportionate
if the same ad bellum objective sought by force clearly could have been achieved by diplomacy or
another nonviolent strategy at a roughly comparable, or even moderately greater, cost.”).
128. See WHITE HOUSE CYBERSPACE STRATEGY, supra note 63, at 14 (“[W]e will exhaust all
options before military force whenever we can; will carefully weigh the costs and risks of action
against the costs of inaction; and will act in a way that reflects our values and strengthens our
legitimacy, seeking broad international support whenever possible.”).
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B. Jus in Bello
Although a stand-alone cyber-attack has never instigated an armed
conflict, cyber-attacks have been used in wars in response to traditional
provocations or to prepare the way for an imminent conventional attack. This
Section examines the relationship between traditional jus in bello requirements
and cyber-attacks employed in the course of conventional armed conflicts. The
novel conditions of cyberspace can pose challenges to applying jus in bello
principles of necessity, proportionality, distinction, and neutrality. Because
cyber-attacks are often not immediately lethal or destructive and may cause
only temporary incapacity of network systems, it may be hard to evaluate
whether a cyber-attack is proportional. It can also be difficult to distinguish
between combatants, civilians directly participating in hostilities, civilians
engaged in a continuous combat function, and protected civilians in the context
of cyber-attacks. Finally, the ease of masking the source of a cyber-attack
makes enforcement of neutrality duties complicated and expensive. We briefly
address each challenge in turn.
1. In Bello Necessity
Although the necessity of a cyber-attack may be difficult to evaluate, this
difficulty arises from line-drawing debates that did not originate in cyberwarfare and are not unique to in bello cyber-attacks. In bello necessity relates to
the concrete military advantage to be gained from a specific hostile act. An
individual cyber-attack may be unnecessary if it does not advance the military’s
objective.129 While cyber-attacks must be necessary to be lawful, evaluating
their in bello necessity does not present novel challenges.
2. In Bello Proportionality
The in bello proportionality requirement prohibits “[a]n attack which may
be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage
to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”130 To

129. In contrast, the ad bellum necessity analysis helps determine if nonforcible measures to
abate a threat are inadequate, excusing an otherwise unlawful use of force.
130. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), art. 51(5)(b), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol Additional I]; see also id. art. 85(3)(b). An indiscriminate attack,
defined by excessive effect, is not to be confused with an attack that does not discriminate amongst
civilian and military objectives, which is defined by objective, and is prohibited by article 85(3)(a). See
infra Part II.B.3. Some scholars argue that, given the ability to avoid civilian casualties or damage to
property and achieve the same military advantage, a state must do so. See DIMITRIOS DELIBASIS, THE
RIGHT TO NATIONAL SELF-DEFENSE IN INFORMATION WARFARE OPERATIONS 268 (2007) (arguing
that the “unmatched accuracy” of information warfare “practically nullifies the element of chance
embodied in all military entanglements”); Dakota S. Rudesill, Precision War and Responsibility:
Transformational Military Technology and the Duty of Care Under the Laws of War, 32 YALE J. INT’L
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conduct a jus in bello proportionality analysis, a military decision maker must
weigh potential civilian casualties, destruction of civilian property, and the loss
of indispensable civilian items against the benefit of achieving a military
objective.131
Due to the nature of harm they inflict, the proportionality of cyber-attacks
poses unique challenges. It can be difficult to evaluate whether an attack would
be proportional according to the relevant categories of “loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,” as the
typical direct effects of cyber-attacks may be nonlethal or temporary, yet
severe.132 In particular, how should the temporary incapacity of critical systems
be evaluated?133 A cyber-attack that effectively stops the transmission of
information through the Internet might merely inconvenience the populace, but
it might also have more severe consequences. For example, it might cause
hospitals to be unable to communicate vital information, leading to loss of life.
An ex ante in bello proportionality analysis for a DDOS attack may therefore
carry a much greater degree of uncertainty than would a conventional attack.
An in bello proportionality analysis requires anticipating the probable
consequences of an action, but additional uncertainty will make that analysis
much more difficult in the cyber context. As a result, cyber-attacks may change
the weight given to temporary consequences, and may force states to confront
more uncertainty than they typically face in making decisions about the legality
of planned attacks.
3. Distinction
The principle of distinction—which requires states to distinguish civilian
and military personnel and restrict attacks to military objectives134—presents
L. 517, 535 (2007) (arguing that the United States might be held to heightened standard of care due to
advances in military technology).
131. Protocol Additional I, supra note 130, arts. 51(5)(b), 54, 57(2)(a)(iii). After deciding that
the target is a military objective, the elements of the balancing test include “target selection, the means
and methods chosen for the military strike, the lack of negligence in the execution of the military
strike, and the determination of what constitutes the military advantage of a particular military strike.”
Randy W. Stone, Protecting Civilians During Operation Allied Force: The Enduring Importance of
the Proportional Response and NATO’s Use of Armed Force in Kosovo, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 501,
522 (2001).
132. Protocol Additional I, supra note 130, art. 57(2)(a)(iii).
133. Similar questions arise in debates around nonlethal deployments of biological and
chemical weapons, such as riot agents. See James D. Fry, Gas Smells Awful: U.N. Forces, RiotControl Agents, and the Chemical Weapons Convention, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 475 (2010); Mirko
Sossai, Drugs as Weapons: Disarmament Treaties Facing the Advances in Biochemistry and NonLethal Weapons Technology, 15 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 5 (2010).
134. Louise Doswald-Beck, Some Thoughts on Computer Network Attack and the
International Law of Armed Conflict, in COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
163, 166 (Michael N. Schmitt & Brian T. O’Donnell eds., 2002). Distinction also imposes
responsibilities on combatants to identify themselves in order to facilitate distinction on the battlefield
and to receive the protections that are due to combatants. See Watts, supra note 84, at 438–39. States
also have a duty to facilitate distinction: “The application of this duty requires that personnel and
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another legal challenge.135 Under this principle, military commanders must
employ weapons that can target accurately and must use this capability to
distinguish between civilian and military objectives.136 By extension, the law of
war prohibits in bello cyber-attacks that are uncontrollable, unpredictable, or do
not discriminate between civilian and military objectives.137 Furthermore,
Additional Protocol I prohibits attacks that deny the civilian population
indispensable objects, such as food or water supplies.138
There are situations where the principle of distinction is easily applied to
cyber-attacks. For example, a cyber-attack that targets a military air traffic
control system and only causes a troop transport to crash would comply with
the principle of distinction.139 Other cyber-attacks would clearly violate the
principle of distinction—for example, an attack on the civilian banking sector
or on hospitals, museums, or places of worship.140 Cyber-attacks against the
networks that manage these targets, like any other attack on these objects,
would be unlawful.141
Such cases are easy, but cyberspace offers many much more difficult
ones. The distinction analysis will often be complicated in the context of a
cyber-attack because the likely targets are used by a multiplicity of actors at
once. Ninety-five percent of military communications use civilian networks at
some stage,142 so it is possible that civilian networks could be attractive
military targets.143 Because much of cyberspace is dual use—used by both the

equipment directly engaged in information warfare be located in facilities whose attack by kinetic
weapons would not result in excessive collateral damage.” Brown, supra note 86, at 192.
135. See DELIBASIS, supra note 130, at 274 (arguing that information warfare will likely run
afoul of distinction and proportionality); Kelsey, supra note 73, at 1431 (arguing that cyber-attacks
will often violate the principles of distinction and neutrality).
136. See Jensen, supra note 84, at 1154. The ICJ has found that nuclear weapons may violate
international humanitarian law if they cannot be used in a manner that distinguishes between civilians
and military objectives. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, ¶ 78 (Jul. 8).
137. Military objectives are targets that meet two criteria: they serve a military purpose and
their incapacitation conveys a definite advantage. Protocol Additional I, supra note 130, art. 52(2). For
example, the first missile strikes of Operation Desert Storm in 1991 targeted Iraqi radar stations.
Kanuck, supra note 121, at 282. On distinction, see Doswald-Beck, supra note 134, at 165–71; Brown,
supra note 86, at 195 (comparing malicious code, which is indiscriminate, to biological weapons).
Schmitt also argues that indiscriminate weapons are unlawful, including in that category not only
cyber-attacks that cannot distinguish civilian and military objects, but also those which cannot be
limited to a military objective. Schmitt, supra note 84, at 201 (citing Protocol Additional I, supra note
130, art. 51(4)).
138. Protocol Additional I, supra note 130, art. 54(2).
139. Schmitt, supra note 84, at 196 (“Military equipment and facilities . . . are clearly military
objectives.”).
140. See, e.g., Protocol Additional I, supra note 130, art. 85(4)(d).
141. Schmitt, supra note 84, at 200; Brown, supra note 86, at 199.
142. Antolin-Jenkins, supra note 11, at 133.
143. Jensen later argues that, given that military use of civilian infrastructure makes it a
legitimate military target, the U.S. government has a duty to protect civilian networks from cyber-
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military and civilians—upholding the distinction requirement in cyberspace can
be more challenging than it is in a conventional context.
a. Who May Lawfully Be Targeted in a Cyber-Attack?
Under the law of war, only three categories of individuals may be lawfully
targeted: combatants, civilians directly participating in hostilities, and civilians
acting in a continuous combat function. Civilians lose their right not to be
targeted to the extent that they “take a direct part in hostilities.”144 Furthermore,
under customary international law affirmed by the International Committee of
the Red Cross, civilians who adopt a continuous combat function may also be
targeted.145 These rules are familiar in the post-9/11 context. Yet the unique
characteristics of civilian contributions to and participation in cyber-attacks
threaten to blur the line between direct participation, continuous combat
function, and other types of involvement in the execution of hostilities.146
The civilian designer of a weapons system has traditionally not been
treated as a direct participant in hostilities. However, the programmer who
works with military intelligence may tweak the code to enable the attack, right
up until the moment of the attack.147 The actions of such a civilian—
particularly of a civilian who regularly engages in such activity—could be
considered a “continuous function [that] involves the preparation, execution, or
command of acts or operations amounting to direct participation in
hostilities.”148 As a result, civilians involved in cyber-attacks might be regarded
as performing tasks that alter their status under the law of war, rendering them
lawful targets of a counterattack.149
b. Who May Lawfully Carry Out a Cyber-Attack?
In addition to the question of who may be targeted in a cyber-attack, the
principle of distinction restricts how states constitute their cyber-fighting

attacks. Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber Warfare and Precautions Against the Effects of Attacks, 88 TEX. L.
REV. 1533 (2010).
144. Protocol Additional I, supra note 130, art. 51(3).
145. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT
PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 16 (2009), available
at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0990.pdf [hereinafter ICRC, INTERPRETIVE
GUIDANCE].
146. See id. at 37 (noting the challenge that private contractors and civilian employees pose to
the definition of direct participation due to “geographic and organizational closeness”).
147. Watts, supra note 84, at 429.
148. ICRC, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 145, at 34.
149. Geoffrey S. Corn, Unarmed but How Dangerous? Civilian Augmentees, the Law of
Armed Conflict, and the Search for a More Effective Test for Permissible Civilian Battlefield
Functions, 2 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 257, 286-87 (2008). Although the principle that a civilian who
directly participates in hostilities or who adopts a continuous combat function may be lawfully
attacked is not in dispute, the status of a civilian who provides indispensable, contemporaneous
assistance in cyber-attacks remains unresolved.
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forces.150 A state that sponsors use of force by civilians may be placing those
civilians outside the protections they enjoy under the law of armed conflict, and
may be undermining the principle of distinction between combatants and
civilians.151
Despite the legal consequences, there are many reasons to think states will
be tempted to use civilians in the cyber context. First, civilians may possess
technical expertise that governments do not. Second, by using civilians to carry
out cyber-attacks, states can mask their own involvement in such operations.152
For example, Nashi—a pro-Kremlin youth group started by Vladimir Putin—
has taken responsibility for the 2007 cyber-attacks against Estonia.153 It has
been alleged that Russian business owners fund Nashi to carry out cyberattacks favored by the Russian government. The business owners “ingratiate
themselves with the regime,” and the Russian government may plausibly deny
involvement in the attack.154
A former Special Assistant for Law of War Matters of the Judge Advocate
General, Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey S. Corn, argues that the current direct
participation test is outdated.155 He offers a new functional discretion test to
determine who may carry out a cyber-attack based on whether “the exercise of
discretion associated with this function [will] implicate [law of war]
compliance.”156 Operating within a command relationship is the dispositive
criterion for combatant status “because members of the armed forces are
subject to responsible command, and they operate within a military hierarchy

150. Watts, supra note 84, at 420.
151. See DELIBASIS, supra note 130, at 281. The allocation of responsibilities for cyberwarfare has been examined by the U.S. armed forces—the recently declassified Air Force cyberspace
operations document explains that National Guard members may train for, but not carry out, cyberattacks. See U.S. AIR FORCE, CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS: AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 3-12, at
29 (2010), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afdd3-12.pdf. Even though the United States
has launched a new Cyber Command, the details of responsibility for defending against a cyber-attack
are still being worked out. See Jim Garamone, Official Details DOD Cybersecurity Environment, AM.
FORCES PRESS SERV. (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=61356
(“Government and private officials are grappling with basics such as what constitutes a cyber attack
and who has responsibility to defend against threats.”). The DoD strategy emphasizes partnering with
the private sector to encourage innovation, incremental improvements, and workforce development,
but says little about the nature of those collaborations. See DOD STRATEGY, supra note 32, at 10–11.
152. States that do so may not only deny those civilians the protections due to civilians under
the laws of war, but may also be guilty of perfidy themselves. See Protocol Additional I, supra note
130, art. 37.
153. See Hollis, supra note 10, at 1024–25 (describing the attacks against Estonia);
Shachtman, supra note 57.
154. Shachtman, supra note 57.
155. Cf. supra note 146 and accompanying text.
156. Corn, supra note 149, at 287. Corn emphasizes the importance of distinction and law of
war compliance, for regular forces and for paramilitaries. Id. at 264–65. This functional test is different
from Schmitt’s consequences test, which focuses on whether the cyber-attack would cause foreseeable
death, injury, or destruction.
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involving training, discipline, and unitary loyalty.”157 Corn argues that only
individuals subject to command authority should be able to exercise discretion
that could result in a law of armed conflict violation, because the actions of
those individuals are within a command and discipline structure that can
prevent and punish violations.158 Under this reasoning, states may not employ
civilian contractors to carry out activities where they will exercise discretion
that implicates the law of armed conflict.
4. Neutrality
A final challenge in evaluating the legality of an in bello cyber-attack is
the fact that a cyber-attack may appear to originate, or may actually originate,
from a neutral state.159 A state may be neutral, either permanently, such as
Switzerland, or for the duration of a specific conflict.160 The principle of
neutrality includes both rights and responsibilities: “The principal right of the
neutral nation is that of inviolability; its principal duties are those of abstention
and impartiality. Conversely, it is the duty of a belligerent to respect the former
and its right to insist upon the latter.”161
Scholars hold differing views regarding neutral states’ obligations to
guard against the use of their facilities by belligerents. Some argue that neutral
states are not obligated to stop belligerents from using their communications
facilities, but they may not help belligerents build such facilities.162 Others
argue that neutral states that are unable or unwilling to stop an unlawful attack
originating from their territory, including their information systems, may
lawfully be targeted for the purpose of stopping the unlawful attack.163 They
claim that states have an obligation not only to refrain from committing cyberattacks themselves, but also “not to allow knowingly [their] territory to be used
for acts contrary to the rights of other States.”164

157. Corn, supra note 149, at 287; see also Brown, supra note 86, at 191 (arguing that only
armed forces should carry out cyber-attacks). But see SUSAN W. BRENNER, CYBERTHREATS: THE
EMERGING FAULT LINES OF THE NATION STATE 199 (2009) (arguing that the rationale for excluding
civilians was to protect them from retaliatory attack, but since civilian infrastructure is very likely to be
attacked in cyber-warfare, this rationale for excluding civilians from combat is less persuasive).
158. Corn, supra note 149, at 261.
159. See BRENNER, supra note 157, at 131–32 (noting the difficulty of identifying attackers in
the cyber-threat context); see also Brown, supra note 86, at 208 (on rights and responsibilities of
neutrality).
160. See George K. Walker, Information Warfare and Neutrality, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
1079, 1141–42 (2000) (discussing neutrality and information warfare).
161. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 84, ¶ 7.2 (noting also that “[t]his customary law
has, to some extent, been modified by the Charter of the United Nations”).
162. See Doswald-Beck, supra note 134, at 176.
163. See DELIBASIS, supra note 130, at 284; COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 84, ¶
7.3.
164. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Albania) (Merits), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9). See, e.g.,
Sklerov, supra note 93, at 43.
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Certain characteristics of cyber-attacks make the evaluation of the
principle of neutrality unusually complex. Cyber-attacks may harness zombie
computers located in one country to harm networks in another country—
without the knowledge of any individual, much less the government—by
masking their origin through a series of servers and computers.165 Such cyberattacks pose challenges to analysis under the principle of neutrality for two
reasons. First, a country may not know its computers are being used for a
cyber-attack, and it therefore may not know its neutrality is threatened. Second,
the principle of neutrality determines lawful responses to attacks based on the
identity of the origin country. Consequently, the inability to attribute attacks to
a certain state impedes the neutrality analysis.166 However, it is also possible
that political uncertainty about lawful responses to cyber-attack may be
masquerading as an inability to attribute attacks; further clarity around the legal
framework governing cyber-attacks may reduce barriers to attribution. While
the political problems of attribution might contribute to the apparent difficulties
of attribution, the possibility remains that a country may not know attacks are
emanating from its borders.
The existing law of war framework—both jus ad bellum and jus in
bello—provides some guidance, albeit incomplete and imperfect, for states
seeking to determine the scope of permissible offensive and defensive cyberattacks. But it does not regulate the vast majority of cyber-attacks. Most cyberattacks do not rise to the level of an armed attack or take place in the context of
an armed conflict. Consequently, they do not implicate the law of war. Yet this
does not necessarily mean that these cyber-attacks are unregulated. As the next
Part shows, there are a variety of other legal frameworks that fill some of the
gaps left by the law of war framework.
III.
OTHER LEGAL FRAMEWORKS GOVERNING CYBER-ATTACKS
There are several existing legal frameworks in addition to the law of war
that explicitly or implicitly regulate cyber-attacks. We begin with what is
potentially the most important such framework—the international law of
countermeasures, which regulates how states may respond to international law
violations that do not rise to the level of an armed attack justifying self-defense.
Next, we outline the international legal regimes that directly regulate some
elements of cyber-attacks. We then describe international legal regimes that
indirectly govern some cyber-attacks by regulating the means through which
those attacks are conducted. Finally, we examine U.S. domestic laws that could
be used to address some cyber-attacks.

165. Goldsmith, supra note 54, at 10–12.
166. Shanker & Bumiller, supra note 53 (“Officials say the main challenge for the United
States in a retaliatory cyberoperation is determining the attacker.”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2134932

02-Hathaway (Do Not Delete)

2012]

7/6/2012 12:47:17 AM

THE LAW OF CYBER-ATTACK

857

These other bodies of law offer victims of cyber-attacks useful tools for
responding to attacks. Yet each individual tool has significant limits. Even
taken together, the legal framework is piecemeal and incomplete. This should
come as no surprise: much of the law that applies to cyber-attacks was not
designed for this purpose. This Part sets the stage for reflections on legal
reforms that would enable domestic and international law to more effectively
regulate cyber-attacks.
A. Countermeasures
The customary international law of countermeasures governs how states
may respond to international law violations that do not rise to the level of an
armed attack justifying self-defense—including, implicitly, cyber-attacks. The
Draft Articles on State Responsibility define countermeasures as “measures
that would otherwise be contrary to the international obligations of an injured
State vis-à-vis the responsible State, if they were not taken by the former in
response to an internationally wrongful act by the latter in order to procure
cessation and reparation.”167
The international law of countermeasures does not define when a cyberattack is unlawful. Indeed, the Draft Articles do not directly address cyberattacks at all. The law simply provides that when a state commits an
international law violation, an injured state may respond with a
countermeasure.168 As explained above, some cyber-attacks that do not rise to
the level of an armed attack nonetheless violate the customary international law
norm of nonintervention.169 These violations of international law may entitle a
harmed state to use countermeasures to bring the responsible state into
compliance with the law.
The Draft Articles lay out the basic customary international law principles
regulating states’ resort to countermeasures.170 The Draft Articles provide that
countermeasures must be targeted at the state responsible for the prior wrongful
act and must be temporary and instrumentally directed to induce the
responsible state to cease its violation.171 Accordingly, countermeasures cannot
167. Draft Articles, supra note 109, at 128. Traditionally, these acts were termed “reprisals,”
but this report follows the Draft Articles in using the more modern term “countermeasures.” Reprisals
now predominantly refer to forceful belligerent reprisals. Id.
168. States thus resort to countermeasures at their own risk. If the use of countermeasures does
not comply with the applicable international legal requirements, the state may itself be responsible for
an internationally wrongful act. Id. at 130.
169. See supra Part II.A.1.
170. Countermeasures are distinct from retorsions. Retorsions are acts that are unfriendly but
lawful, such as limiting diplomatic relations or withdrawing from voluntary aid programs, and they
always remain a lawful means for a State to respond to a cyber-attack or other international legal
violation.
171. Draft Articles, supra note 109, at 129. Accordingly, the law of countermeasures does not
specify how states may respond to international law violations by non–state actors. However,
international law violations by non–state actors often lead to international law violations by states. For
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be used if the international law violation has ceased. Countermeasures also can
never justify the violation of fundamental human rights, humanitarian
prohibitions on reprisals, or peremptory international norms, nor can they
excuse failure to comply with dispute settlement procedures or to protect the
inviolability of diplomats.172
Before resorting to countermeasures, the injured state generally must call
upon the responsible state to cease its wrongful conduct, notify it of the
decision to employ countermeasures, and offer to negotiate a settlement.173
However, in some situations, the injured state “may take such urgent
countermeasures as are necessary to preserve its rights.”174 Countermeasures
need not necessarily be reciprocal, but reciprocal measures are favored over
other types because they are more likely to comply with the requirements of
necessity and proportionality.175
Under the customary law of countermeasures, an attacking state that
violates its obligation not to intervene in another sovereign state through a
harmful cyber-attack may be subject to lawful countermeasures by the injured
state. Such countermeasures might go beyond “passive defenses” that aim to
repel cyber-attacks (such as firewalls), and constitute “active defenses,” which
attempt to disable the source of an attack.176 Active defenses—if properly
designed to meet the requirements of necessity and proportionality—might be
considered a form of “reciprocal countermeasures,” in which the injured state
ceases obeying the same or a related obligation to the one the responsible state
violated (in this case, the obligation of nonintervention).
Before a state may use active defense as a countermeasure, however, it
must determine that an internationally wrongful act caused the state harm and
identify the state responsible, as well as abide by other restrictions.177 The
countermeasures must be designed, for example, to induce the wrongdoing
state to comply with its obligations. The Draft Articles also have detailed
provisions regarding when acts committed by non–state agents may be

example, if a non–state actor launches an attack on state A from state B’s territory and state B is
unwilling or unable to stop it, state B may violate an international law obligation to prevent its territory
from being used for cross-border attacks. See, e.g., Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Albania) (Merits),
1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9) (holding that states are obligated “not to allow knowingly its territory to be
used for acts contrary to the rights of other States”). In the cyber-attack context, a state may commit an
international law violation by allowing harmful cyber-attacks to be launched from its territory. See
Sklerov, supra note 93, at 62–72.
172. Draft Articles, supra note 109, at 131.
173. Id. at 135.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 129.
176. DoD has recently made clear that it employs such “active cyber defense” to “detect and
stop malicious activity before it can affect DoD networks and systems.” DOD STRATEGY, supra note
32, at 7.
177. Draft Articles, supra note 109, at 129–34.
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attributed to a state—for instance, when the state aids and assists the act with
knowledge of the circumstances.178
While countermeasures provide states with a valuable tool for addressing
cyber-attacks that do not rise to the level of an armed attack, countermeasures
are far from a panacea. First and foremost, they require the identity of the
attacker and the computer or network from which the attack originates to be
accurately identified. Second, in order for a countermeasure to be effective, the
targeted actor must find the countermeasure costly—ideally costly enough to
cease its unlawful behavior. If the target can easily relocate its operations, as is
often possible in the cyber context, the countermeasure may not impose a
significant cost on the actor responsible for the attack. For this reason,
countermeasures are likely to be more effective against state actors and less
effective against non–state actors. Finally, it can be difficult to design a
countermeasure that injures only the actor that perpetuated the legally wrongful
attack. In particular, a countermeasure that disables a computer or network may
very well cause harm to those who have little or nothing to do with the
unlawful attacks. This could have the perverse effect of making the state
injured by the original attack a perpetrator of an unlawful attack against those
who simply happen to share a network with the actor that generated the original
attack, or whose computers were used as pawns without its knowledge or
acquiescence. Together, these challenges can lead a system that relies too
heavily on active countermeasures to spin out of control. As a result, the
customary law of countermeasures offers only a partial answer to the problem
of cyber-attacks. We thus turn next to other international legal regimes that
directly regulate cyber-attacks.
B. International Legal Regimes That Directly Regulate Cyber-Attacks
While no comprehensive international legal framework currently governs
all cyber-attacks, a patchwork of efforts provides some tools the United States
and other countries can employ to control this growing threat. This Section
surveys legal mechanisms created by the United Nations, NATO, the Council
of Europe, the Organization of American States, and the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization to directly regulate cyber-attacks. While both the Council of
Europe and the Organization of American States have taken actions relating to
cyber-crime—a category of activity that overlaps in part with cyber-attacks, as
noted above—the increased computer network protection and regulations are
also relevant to efforts to combat cyber-attacks. Collectively, these
organizational measures demonstrate a growing interest in addressing this issue
through common legal frameworks. Yet these efforts have thus far fallen short
of establishing a rigorous legal framework that can effectively govern all cyberattacks.
178.

Id. at 65.
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1. The United Nations
There has been only limited U.N. action on the issue of cyber-security.
The U.N. General Assembly has passed several related resolutions.179 These
resolutions, however, are vague and have not required any specific action by
U.N. members.180
In August 1999, the United Nations sponsored an international meeting of
experts in Geneva to better grasp the security implications of emerging
information technologies.181 A follow-up General Assembly resolution in 2002
called for further consideration and discussion of “information security.”182 The
resolution also called for a new study of international informational security
issues,183 but little action resulted.184 The United Nations sponsored a twophase summit in 2003 and 2005 called the World Summit on the Information
Society, but again with little concrete result.185
The United Nations did take a step forward in July 2010, when
government cyber-security specialists from fifteen countries—including major

179. These resolutions have been based on the ongoing agenda item: “Developments in the
field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security.” See, e.g., G.A.
Res. 58/32, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/32 (Dec. 8, 2003); G.A. Res. 59/61, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/61 (Dec.
3, 2004); G.A. Res. 60/45, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/45 (Jan. 6, 2006); G.A. Res. 61/54, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/54 (Dec. 19, 2006); G.A. Res. 62/17, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/17 (Jan. 8, 2008); G.A. Res.
63/37, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/37 (Jan. 9, 2009); G.A. Res. 64/25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/25 (Jan. 14,
2010).
180. This is equally true of the General Assembly’s two related resolutions on the Creation of
a Global Culture of Cybersecurity and the Protection of Critical Informational Infrastructures, G.A.
Res. 58/199, U.N. Doc. No. A/RES/58/199 (Jan. 30, 2004), and Creation of a Global Culture of
Cybersecurity and Taking Stock of National Efforts to Protect Critical Information Infrastructures,
G.A. Res. 64/211, U.N. Doc. No. A/RES/64/211 (Mar. 17, 2010).
181. G.A. Res. 54/49, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/49 (Dec. 23, 1999).
182. Id. ¶ 1. The resolution called upon Member States to:
promote further at multilateral levels the consideration of existing and potential threats in
the field of information security, as well as possible measures to limit the threats emerging
in this field . . . [and] . . . [i]nvite[ed] all Member States to continue to inform the SecretaryGeneral of their views and assessments on the following questions:
(a) General appreciation of the issues of information security;
(b) Definition of basic notions related to information security, including
unauthorized interference with or misuse of information and
telecommunications systems and information resources . . . .
Id. ¶¶ 1-3.
183. Id. ¶ 4.
184. Similar exhortations appear in subsequent resolutions. See G.A. Res. 58/32, supra note
179, ¶ 4; G.A. Res. 59/61, supra note 179, ¶ 4; G.A. Res. 60/45, supra note 179, ¶ 4; G.A. Res. 61/54,
supra note 179, ¶ 4; G.A. Res. 62/17, supra note 179, ¶ 4; G.A. Res. 63/37, supra note 179, ¶ 4; G.A.
Res. 64/25, supra note 179, ¶ 4.
185. See WORLD SUMMIT ON THE INFORMATION SOCIETY: GENEVA 2003–TUNIS 2005,
http://www.itu.int/wsis/index.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2012) (compiling conference documents and
follow-up documents, including annual “outcome documents”); G.A. Res. 60/252, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/60/252 (Apr. 27, 2006) (“Urges Member States, relevant United Nations bodies and other
intergovernmental organizations, as well as non-governmental organizations, civil society and the
private sector, to contribute actively, inter alia by initiating actions, where appropriate, to the
implementation and follow-up of the outcomes of the Geneva and Tunis phases of the Summit.”).
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cyber-powers like the United States, China, and Russia—submitted a set of
recommendations to the U.N. Secretary-General as “an initial step towards
building the international framework for security and stability that these new
technologies require.”186 The recommendations called for
i. Further dialogue among States . . . ;
ii. Confidence-building, stability and risk reduction measures . . .
including exchanges of national views on the use of
[information and communication technologies] in conflict;
iii. Information exchanges on national legislation and national
information and communications technologies security
strategies and technologies, policies and best practices;
iv. Identification of measures to support capacity-building in less
developed countries;
v. Finding possibilities to elaborate common terms and
definitions . . . .187
Though vague, these recommendations represent real progress in overcoming a
long impasse between the United States and Russia over how to address cybersecurity issues.188 The cooperation may even suggest possibilities for a future
multilateral treaty under the auspices of the United Nations, which Russia has
been advocating for some time.189 At present, however, the role of the United
Nations with respect to cyber-security remains largely limited to discussions
and information sharing.
2. NATO
NATO recently began to address the threat of cyber-attacks. NATO did
little in response to the 2007 cyber-attack on Estonia, laying bare that it “lacked
both coherent cyber doctrine and comprehensive cyber strategy.”190 On the
heels of that attack,191 NATO held its first meeting—the 2008 Bucharest
186. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments
in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, 4, U.N.
Doc. A/65/201 (July 30, 2010).
187. Id. at 8.
188. Historically Russia and the United States have expressed conflicting views on cybersecurity as it relates to sovereignty and political dissent as well as international cooperation. See, e.g.,
TIM MAURER, CYBER NORM EMERGENCE AT THE UNITED NATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
ACTIVITIES AT THE UN REGARDING CYBER-SECURITY 1, 17, 25, 27, 47 (2011) (describing the
contrasting views of the two countries).
189. John Markoff, Step Taken to End Impasse over Cybersecurity Talks, N.Y. TIMES, July 17,
2010, at A7.
190. Rex B. Hughes, NATO and Cyber Defence: Mission Accomplished?, ATLANTISCH
PERSPECTIEF (Apr. 2009), available at http://www.atlcom.nl/site/english/nieuws/wp-content/Hughes.
pdf.
191. This followed an October 2007 meeting of NATO defense ministers during which they
called for the development of a NATO cyber-defense policy. NATO Opens New Centre of Excellence
on Cyber Defence, N. ATL. TREATY ORG. NEWS (May 14, 2008), http://www.nato.int/docu/update/
2008/05-may/e0514a.html.
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Summit—to formally address cyber-attacks. This summit prompted the
creation of two new NATO divisions focused on cyber-attacks: the Cyber
Defence Management Authority and the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of
Excellence.192
The Cyber Defence Management Authority aims to centralize cyberdefense capabilities across NATO members. Although little information is
publicly available, the Authority is believed to possess “real-time electronic
monitoring capabilities for pinpointing threats and sharing critical cyber
intelligence in real-time,” with the goal of eventually becoming an operational
war room for cyber-defense.193
The Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence aspires to “advance
the development of long-term NATO cyber defence doctrine and strategy.”194
The North Atlantic Council, however, retains control of NATO cyber-policy
and defense.195 Despite strong pressure from Eastern European countries,
cyber-attacks are still considered to activate only Article 4 of the NATO treaty,
which calls upon members to “consult together” in cases of cyber-attacks, but
does not bind them to “assist” each other, as would be required under Article
5.196
Although NATO’s creation of these two divisions signifies concrete
progress and recognition of the need for a more coherent cyber-strategy,
concerns persist that “these teeth may not be sufficiently sharp to ward off any
mischievous cyber bears or other e-adversaries seeking to compromise or
destroy NATO digital assets deployed in either the Euro-Atlantic community or
the ‘near abroad.’”197 NATO’s cyber-plans and capabilities are still nascent.
3. Council of Europe
The Council of Europe198 has taken the most direct and concrete approach
to regulating a subset of the cyber-security problem—in particular, cybercrime—of any international organization to date. As the first international
treaty on crimes committed using the Internet and other computer networks, the
192. Hughes, supra note 190. This is NATO’s tenth COE, and is the only one focused solely
on defending against and countering cyber-attacks. See Scott J. Shackelford, Estonia Three Years
Later: A Progress Report on Combating Cyber Attacks, J. INTERNET L., Feb. 2010, at 22.
193. Hughes, supra note 190.
194. Id.
195. Defending The Networks: The NATO Policy on Cyber Defence, N. ATL. TREATY ORG.
(2011), http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_09/20111004_110914-policy-cyberdefen
ce.pdf (“The NATO Policy on Cyber Defence reiterates that any collective defence response is subject
to decisions of the North Atlantic Council.”).
196. North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 98, arts. 4, 5; see also NATO Agrees Common
Approach to Cyber Defence, supra note 97 (“The competencies of the [Cyber Defence Management
Authority] will fall exclusively on Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty.”).
197. Hughes, supra note 190.
198. Founded in 1949, the Council of Europe aims to promote cooperation amongst its fortyseven European member states.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2134932

02-Hathaway (Do Not Delete)

2012]

7/6/2012 12:47:17 AM

THE LAW OF CYBER-ATTACK

863

2001 Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (“Cybercrime
Convention”) promulgated “a common criminal policy aimed at the protection
of society against cybercrime,” primarily through legislation and international
cooperation.199 The United States ratified the Convention in 2006.200
Cyber-attacks implicate the Cybercrime Convention’s offenses relating to
“confidentiality, integrity, and availability of computer data and systems”—
particularly illegal access, data interference, and system interference.201 These
rules, however, do not appear to apply to government actions, whether taken
for law enforcement or national security purposes.202 For example, Article 2 of
the Convention requires that states adopt “legislative and other measures . . . to
establish as criminal offenses under [their] domestic law, when committed
intentionally, the access to the whole or any part of a computer system without
right.”203 The Convention’s accompanying “explanatory report” clarifies that
the “without right” caveat allows for classic legal defenses, such as self-defense
or necessity, but also “leaves unaffected conduct undertaken pursuant to lawful
government authority”—including acts to “maintain public order, protect
national security or investigate criminal offences.”204 This suggests, as Duncan
Hollis and others have argued, that the Convention negotiators were aware of
state interests in using cyber-attacks and sought to draft the agreement to permit
such governmental action.205
Nonetheless, the Cybercrime Convention may still impose limited
constraints on the execution of cyber-attack operations by ratifying countries.
Parties to the Convention have agreed to “co-operate with each other . . . to the
widest extent possible for the purposes of investigations or proceedings
199. Cybercrime Convention, supra note 64, pmbl.; see also Rasha AlMahroos, Phishing for
the Answer: Recent Developments in Combating Phishing, 3 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 595,
613 (2008) (“The Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime . . . is the first and only international
treaty that deals explicitly with cybercrime.”).
200. The convention allows members of the Council of Europe and other states that
participated in its elaboration (among them the United States) to join the Convention. Cybercrime
Convention, supra note 66, at ch. IV; Declan McCullagh & Anne Broache, Senate Ratifies
Controversial Cybercrime Treaty, CNET, (Aug. 4, 2006, 11:25 AM), http://news.cnet.com/Senateratifies-controversial-cybercrime-treaty/2100-7348_3-6102354.html. As of January 2012, thirty
countries have ratified the Convention on Cybercrime, and another sixteen have signed but have not
yet ratified it (including Australia, Japan, and South Africa). Convention on Cybercrime, TREATY
OFFICE, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&
CM=8&DF=28/10/2010&CL=ENG (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).
201. Cybercrime Convention, supra note 66, arts. 2, 4, 5.
202. See Arie J. Schaap, Cyber Warfare Operations: Development and Use Under
International Law, 64 A.F. L. REV. 121, 171 (2009) (“However, [the Cybercrime Convention’s] rules
do not apply to government activities, whether for law enforcement or national security purposes.”);
Hollis, supra note 10, at 1052 (“[The Cybercrime Convention’s] rules, however, do not apply to
government activities, whether for law enforcement or national security purposes.”).
203. Cybercrime Convention, supra note 66, art. 2 (emphasis added).
204. Council of Eur., Convention on Cybercrime: Explanatory Report, 109th Sess., ¶ 38 (Nov.
8, 2001), available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/185.htm.
205. Hollis, supra note 10.
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concerning criminal offences related to computer systems and data.”206
Although not explicit, this agreement to cooperate could limit the extent to
which parties to the Convention could conduct cyber-attacks against other state
parties, since that would undermine the overall intent of the agreement. It is
unclear, however, what consequences or repercussions would result from such
a breach of the Convention’s intent and purpose by a state party.
For these reasons, the Convention—the most developed international legal
framework directly regulating cyber-attacks—addresses only a portion of the
overall challenge. It is limited, in particular, both by its failure to regulate most
attacks by state parties and by its largely regional membership. Yet it offers a
starting point for designing a comprehensive international framework for
regulating unlawful cyber-attacks.
4. Organization of American States
The Organization of American States (“OAS”), representing thirty-five
states from the Americas,207 only recently began taking preliminary action to
regulate cyber-attacks. In April 2004, the OAS approved a resolution stating
that member states should “evaluate the advisability of implementing the
principles of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (2001)” and
should “consider the possibility of acceding to that convention.”208 The OAS
also adopted a “Comprehensive Inter-American Cybersecurity Strategy,” which
aims, among other things, to adopt “cybercrime policies and legislation that
will protect Internet users and prevent and deter criminal misuse of computers
and computer networks, while respecting the privacy and individual rights of
Internet users.”209 To this end, the OAS agreed to deploy an Experts Group that
will “provide technical assistance to Member States in drafting and enacting
laws that punish cybercrime, protect information systems, and prevent the use
of computers to facilitate illegal activity.”210 These experts only offer guidance;
the OAS is not promulgating a set of uniform laws with which member states
can combat cyber-crime and cyber-attacks.
At a January 2010 meeting, the OAS Working Group on Cyber-Crime
recommended that members that had not already done so establish state bodies
for investigating and prosecuting cyber-crimes and adopt domestic legislation
206. Cybercrime Convention, supra note 66, art. 23.
207. The OAS aims for its member states to achieve “an order of peace and justice, to promote
their solidarity, to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial
integrity, and their independence.” Charter of the Organization of American States art. 1, available at
http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_A-41_Charter_of_the_Organization_of_American_States.htm.
208. Organization of American States, AG/RES. 2040 (XXXIV-O/04), at ch. IV, ¶ 8 (June 8,
2004), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/ga04/agres_2040.htm.
209. Organization of American States, AG/RES. 2004 (XXXIV-O/04), at app. A, (June 8,
2004), available at http://www.oas.org/XXXIVGA/english/docs/approved_documents/adoption_
strategy_combat_threats_cybersecurity.htm.
210. Id.
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criminalizing cyber-crime and enabling international cooperation to investigate
and prosecute such crimes.211 The Working Group pledged to review the
progress made in implementing these measures at its next meeting.212 The OAS
has thus begun a useful regional conversation on joint strategies for battling the
portion of cyber-attacks that constitute cyber-crime, but it has not yet
developed a more active program for addressing cyber-attacks more generally.
5. Shanghai Cooperation Organization
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, an intergovernmental mutual
security organization founded in 2001 by China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan,213 has taken significant preliminary steps
toward cooperation in the cyber-security area. In its Yekaterinburg Declaration
of June 16, 2009, “[t]he SCO member states stress[ed] the significance of the
issue of ensuring international information security as one of the key elements
of the common system of international security.”214 The Organization presents
a possible center of gravity in international legal action on cyber-attacks. As
explained above,215 the Organization has thus far adopted an expansive
understanding of cyber-attacks that includes the use of cyber-technology to
undermine political stability. As such, it represents a model that is likely to be
at odds with that of Western Europe and the United States, which have sought
to avoid regulations of cyber-activities that may interfere with the expression of
political dissent.216
As this Section demonstrates, international efforts to regulate cyberattacks are still at an embryonic stage. With the possible exception of the
Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime, most international agreements
have not proceeded beyond the stage of discussing future strategies.
Nonetheless, the widespread efforts demonstrate increasing interest in
establishing a set of transnational regulations to address cyber-attacks. The
diversity of approaches taken by these organizations also demonstrates that the
central challenge—at least initially—will be defining the scope of the activity
that should be addressed in an international agreement. Before we outline our
recommendations for future efforts at directly regulating cyber-attacks,
however, we first must complete the existing legal picture by outlining the
211. Organization of American States, Sixth Meeting of the Working Group on Cyber-Crime,
Recommendations, Jan. 21–22, 2010, OEA/Ser.K/XXXIV, CIBER-VI/doc.4/10 rev. 1, ¶¶ 1–2,
available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/cyb_VIrec_en.pdf.
212. Id. ¶ 17.
213. These six countries are the only members of the SCO, though others are able to
participate as observer states, dialogue partners, and guest attendees. More information on the SCO
can be found here: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/sco/t57970.htm.
214. CONSULATE GEN. OF UZB. IN N.Y.C., YEKATERINBURG DECLARATION OF THE HEADS
OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANISATION, (July 9, 2009),
http://www.uzbekconsulny.org/news/572/.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 24–27.
216. MAURER, supra note 188.
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international regimes that indirectly regulate cyber-attacks as well as the
domestic laws that address cyber-attacks.
C. International Legal Regimes That Indirectly Regulate Cyber-Attacks
Several international legal frameworks are not directly aimed at cyberattacks but nonetheless regulate means that may be used in or may be a focus of
a cyber-attack. These include, most notably, the international law governing
telecommunications, aviation, space, and the law of sea.217 These legal regimes
were largely formed prior to the emergence of cyber-attacks and therefore do
not expressly regulate or prohibit cyber-attacks. Instead, these “means-based”
frameworks can be used to address a cyber-attack only if the attack employs the
particular means regulated by the agreement.218 Hence the international regimes
that indirectly regulate cyber-attacks provide a patchwork of laws that are
likely to apply to only a small portion of harmful cyber-attacks.
1. Telecommunications Law
Cyber-attacks that involve international wire or radio frequency
communications may be subject to telecommunications law. Modern
international telecommunications law is regulated by the International
Telecommunications Union, the leading U.N. agency that establishes
217. While a number of countries have recognized Internet access as a human right, we do not
discuss it here, due to its diffuse and currently unenforceable status. See, e.g., David Meyer, European
‘Internet Freedom’ Law Agreed, ZDNET (Nov. 5, 2009, 1:11 PM), http://www.zdnet.co.uk/news/
networking/2009/11/05/european-internet-freedom-law-agreed-39860587/. It therefore would not offer
an alternate governing legal framework for cyber-attack with any practical significance. Moreover, the
right to access the Internet does not implicate one of the key elements of our proposed cyber-attack
definition: a national security or political purpose.
218. See Richard W. Aldrich, The International Legal Implications of Information Warfare,
AIRPOWER J., Fall 1996, at 99, 109, available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/au/aldrich.pdf
(“[M]ost of the law to which legal scholars are looking for guidance was developed, in many cases,
decades before information warfare concepts were envisioned.”); Barkham, supra note 122, at 95–96
(discussing existing treaty regimes that could be used to regulate information warfare); Dimitrios
Delibasis, State Use of Force in Cyberspace for Self-Defence: A New Challenge for a New Century,
PEACE, CONFLICT & DEV.: AN INTERDISC. J., Feb. 2006, at 1; BRYAN W. ELLIS, THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF INFORMATION WARFARE: WHAT ARE OUR OPTIONS? 3–
4 (Apr. 10, 2001) (USAWC Strategy Research Project) (explaining how a network attack may
implicate existing international telecommunications law); Schaap, supra note 202, at 160–70
(discussing other treaties and conventions that could impact cyber warfare operations, including the
International Outer Space Law, International Telecommunications Law, and International Aviation
Law); Scott J. Shackelford, From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber Attacks in
International Law, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 191, 250–51 (2009) (“To the extent that cyber attacks are
below the threshold of an armed attack, provisions of space law, nuclear non-proliferation, UNCLOS,
and communications law, all have a role to play in crafting a functioning legal regime.”); David
Willson, A Global Problem: Cyberspace Threats Demand an International Approach, ISSA J., Aug.
2009, at 12, available at http://www.issa.org/Library/Journals/2009/August/Willson-A%20Global%20
Problem.pdf; William Yurcik, Information Warfare: Legal & Ethical Challenges of the Next Global
Battleground, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND ANNUAL ETHICS AND TECHNOLOGY CONFERENCE 1
(1997).
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multinational standards for information and communication technology.219 The
Union’s stated aim is “the preservation of peace and the economic and social
development of all States . . . by means of efficient telecommunications
services.”220 The International Telecommunications Union enacts rules known
as Administrative Regulations, which are treaties that bind all member parties;
Radio Regulations, which also bind all parties; as well as nonbinding
Telecommunications Standards.221 The Union regulates the use of radio and
telecommunication technologies in order to distribute them to member states in
an efficient and equitable manner—for example, through developing methods
of assigning rights to radio spectrums.222
International Telecommunication regulations may be used to address
cyber-attacks that make use of electromagnetic spectrum or international
telecommunications networks. For instance, broadcasting stations from one
nation may not interfere with broadcasts of other states’ services on their
authorized frequencies.223 Member states may cut off any nonstate private
telecommunications that “may appear dangerous to the security of the State or
contrary to its laws, to public order or to decency”224 or suspend international
telecommunication services “either generally or only for certain relations
and/or for certain kinds of correspondence, outgoing, incoming or in transit,
provided that it immediately notifies such action to each of the other Member
States through the Secretary-General.”225 Member states also must regulate
against “harmful interference”226 that “endangers the functioning of a
radionavigation service or of other safety services or seriously degrades,
obstructs or repeatedly interrupts a radiocommunication service”227 and pursue
all possible measures to ensure the secrecy of international correspondence,
219. CHARLES H. KENNEDY & M. VERONICA PASTOR, AN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 30–33 (1996). The International Telecommunications
Convention is the founding charter that established the ITU. The ITU first began in 1865 as the
International Telegraph Union and was founded in order to universalize telegraph services among
mostly European nations. Id. at 30–32. It is based in Geneva, Switzerland, and its membership includes
193 member states and more than seven hundred sector members and associates. About ITU, INT’L
COMM. UNION, http://www.itu.int/net/about/index.aspx (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). The full text of the
Convention is available at Basic Texts of ITU, INT’L COMM. UNION, http://www.itu.int/net/about/
basic-texts/index.aspx (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).
220. Constitution of the International Telecommunications Union, pmbl., Dec. 22, 1992,
available at http://itu.int/net/about/basic-texts/index.aspx [hereinafter ITU Constitution]; see also
International Telecommunications Convention, Nov. 6, 1982, U.N. Doc. 26559.
221. KENNEDY & PASTOR, supra note 219, at 33.
222. More information about the agency’s work is available at Committed to Connecting the
World, INT’L COMM. UNION, http://www.itu.int/en/pages/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 21, 2012); see
also The ITU Mission: Bringing the Benefits of ICT to All the World’s Inhabitants, INT’L COMM.
UNION, http://www.itu.int/net/about/mission.aspx (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).
223. ITU Constitution, supra note 220, art. 45.
224. Id. art. 34.
225. Id. art. 35.
226. Id. art. 6.
227. Id. annex. (definition of “harmful interference”).
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unless such secrecy would contravene their domestic laws or international
conventions.228
Despite the above restrictions, international telecommunications law does
not specifically prohibit the use of telecommunications for military purposes,
such as cyber-attacks. Article 48 states that “Member States retain their entire
freedom with regard to military radio installations.”229 The article requests that
states limit such use: “Nevertheless, these installations must, so far as possible,
observe . . . the measures to be taken to prevent harmful interference.”230 The
International Telecommunications Union cautions against “harmful
interference,” but it allows for military transgressions of these regulations—
without requiring a reporting mechanism or otherwise limiting its use. This
exception might include within its scope cyber-attacks and possibly even cyberwarfare. In addition to this military exception, the International
Telecommunication Union provisions have a second important limitation as a
legal framework for regulating cyber-attacks: violations of Union rules and
regulations have only limited repercussions, given that the Union possesses
little enforcement or punitive capacity.231
2. Aviation Law
Cyber-attack operations that target or interfere with nonmilitary aviation
could implicate three major aviation regulations: the 1944 Chicago Convention
on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention),232 the 1971 Montreal
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against Civil Aviation

228. Id. art. 37.
229. Id. art. 48(1).
230. Id. art. 48(2).
231. The International Telecommunication Union’s main “regulatory” body originally was the
International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB), which was formed “to manage the [radio
frequency] spectrum internationally and to solve arising problems in a neutral manner.” Wladyslaw
Moron, Radio Regulations Board (RRB): ‘Its Place, Role and Functioning in the ITU,’ INT’L
TELECOMM. UNION (Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.itu.int/ITU-R/information/promotion/e-flash/4/
article7.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). Its founders envisioned it as a “cross between the Federal
Communication Commission and the International Court of Justice.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). This board, however, was never empowered to uphold its adjudicatory visions. Id. In 1994,
the Radio Regulations Board subsumed the IFRB, aiming to act as an “independent interpreter and
mediator” when dealing with noncompliance and sometimes conflicting interests of member states. Id.
Even the Board, however, does not have full regulatory authority, since it can only issue
recommendations when cases of “harmful interference” arise. The International Telecommunication
Union (ITU): Structure, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NATIONS, http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/
United-Nations-Related-Agencies/The-International-Telecommunication-Union-ITU-STRUCTURE.
html#b (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). Furthermore, ITU resolutions are not considered legally binding.
See STEPHEN GOROVE, DEVELOPMENTS IN SPACE LAW: ISSUES AND POLICIES 49 (1991) (“While
states generally abide by ITU resolutions, they are not legally bound by them.”).
232. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180 [hereinafter
Chicago Convention].
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(Montreal Convention),233 and the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation
(Montreal Protocol).234 For example, the disruption of air traffic control, the
modification of flight passenger lists, or the addition of a name to a country’s
no-fly list all exemplify cyber-attacks that implicate aviation law.235
The 1944 Chicago Convention created a specialized U.N. agency tasked
with coordinating and regulating international air travel.236 It also established a
set of rules on airspace, aircraft, navigation, registration, and safety.237 The
Convention stipulates that all states must show “due regard for the safety of
navigation of civil aircraft.”238 Cyber-attack operations that target civilian
flights, if launched by a government against another actor, could run counter to
this Convention’s safeguard against interference with civilian flights. Such an
operation would also run afoul of the 1984 amendment against using weapons
targeting a civil aircraft in flight.239 However, the Convention does allow a
member state to derogate from the Convention’s obligations during war or state
emergencies,240 so long as the state “notifies the fact to the Council.”241
The Montreal Convention outlines as unlawful specific conduct that could
jeopardize the safety of civil aviation.242 Article 1 states that a person commits
a crime if he or she intentionally and unlawfully does or attempts to do a series
of acts that would render an aircraft incapable of flight or would seriously
endanger the safety of the aircraft while in flight, including through
“destroy[ing] or damag[ing] air navigation facilities or interfer[ing] with their
operation, . . . or communicat[ing] information which he [or she] knows to be
false, thereby endangering the safety of an aircraft in flight.”243 This agreement
would not seem to restrict any cyber-attack operations unless it rendered an
aircraft unable to fly (for example, by interfering with the aircraft’s operating
system) or endangered the safety of an aircraft in flight (for example,
interfering with air traffic control communication or other aspects of aircraft
navigation).

233. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation,
Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564 [hereinafter Montreal Convention].
234. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving
International Civil Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, 1589 U.N.T.S. 474 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
235. Schaap, supra note 202, at 166.
236. Chicago Convention, supra note 232, arts. 43, 44. The agency is called the International
Civil Aviation Organization. Id.
237. Id. pt. I.
238. Id. art. 3(d).
239. This 1984 amendment to the Chicago Convention “reaffirm[s] the principle of non-use of
weapons against civil aircraft in flight.” Protocol Relating to an Amendment to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, pmbl., May 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 705.
240. Chicago Convention, supra note 232, art. 89.
241. Id.
242. Montreal Convention, supra note 233.
243. Id. art. 1.
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The Montreal Protocol extended the legal framework from civil aircraft in
flight to “acts of violence which endanger or are likely to endanger the safety of
persons at airports . . . or which jeopardize the safe operation of such
airports.”244 Article 2 states that a person commits a crime if he or she
intentionally and unlawfully does or attempts to do any of the following while
using a device, substance, or weapon:
(a) performs an act of violence against a person at an airport
serving international civil aviation which causes or is likely to
cause serious injury or death; or
(b) destroys or seriously damages the facilities of an airport
serving international civil aviation or aircraft not in service
located thereon or disrupts the services of the airport,
if such an act endangers or is likely to endanger safety at that
airport.245
This Protocol thereby prohibits any cyber-attacks that could undermine safety
at an international airport, such as tampering with no-fly lists, passenger
manifests, or an airport’s computer network system.
3. Law of Space
Given that computer-operated satellites are integral to international
telecommunications and military operations, cyber-attacks could implicate
space law. Multiple scholars have proposed that treaties on outer space, the
moon, and damage caused by space objects, as well as satellite regulations,
could be used to regulate cyber-attacks.246 Treaties related to the damage
caused by space objects247 or the moon248 are clearly inapplicable to cyber244. Montreal Protocol, supra note 234, pmbl.
245. Id. art. 2.
246. Aldrich, supra note 218, at 20–24; Delibasis, supra note 218, at 15–17 (discussing how
the law of space is applicable to cyber-warfare); LAWRENCE T. GREENBERG ET AL., INFORMATION
WARFARE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 8–9 (1998) (“Space law, though, leaves ample room for
information warfare.”); Hollis, supra note 10, at 1051 (“[B]ecause information infrastructures
frequently use outer space to relay communications or collect data, space law may affect [information
operations].”); Schaap, supra note 202, at 160–69 (discussing international outer space law,
international telecommunications law, and international aviation law as legal regimes that states should
consider in developing cyber-warfare operations).
247. The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects lays out
a set of procedures for determining state liability for activities in outer space. Article 2 states that “[a]
launching State shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space object
on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft in flight.” Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects, art 2, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187. The Convention
defines damage as “loss of life, personal injury or other impairment of health; or loss of or damage to
property of States or of persons, natural or juridical, or property of international intergovernmental
organizations.” Id. art 1. It is unlikely, however, that the definition of damage or of space object would
apply to cyber-attacks.
248. The Moon Treaty grants the international community jurisdiction over all heavenly
bodies, including the orbits around such bodies. Agreement Governing the Activities of States in Outer
Space, on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Dec. 5, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 53. The treaty refers to
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attacks as we have defined them, and therefore we do not discuss them here.
Instead, we focus on satellite regulations and the Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities in the Exploitation and Use of Outer Space. We
conclude, however, that these treaties also have little promise for the regulation
of cyber-attacks.
The 1967 Outer Space Treaty provides for the free exploration of space
and prohibits the use of space for particular destructive purposes.249 It stipulates
that
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the
Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of
weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies,
or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.
The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties
to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes.250
The Outer Space Treaty expressly permits certain military uses of space, such
as earth orbit military reconnaissance satellites, remote sensing satellites,
military global positioning systems, and space-based aspects of an antiballistic
missile system.251 Because cyber-attacks are unlikely to cause mass destruction
of the kind contemplated in the treaty, it is unlikely that cyber-attacks could be
properly characterized as prohibited by the treaty.252
Satellite regulations offer another potential avenue for cyber-attack
regulation. The Agreement Relating to the 1971 International
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (“Telecommunications Satellite
Organization”)253 and the Convention of the 1979 International Maritime
Satellite Organization (“Maritime Satellite Organization”)254 contain “peaceful
purpose” provisions applicable to satellites similar to the Outer Space Treaty.
the “common heritage of mankind,” reflecting a belief that all nations should share equitably in
benefits derived from resources on the moon and other celestial bodies. Id. art. 11(1). The treaty also
underscores that the moon should be used exclusively for “peaceful purposes.” Id. art. 3. Beyond this
principle, however, the treaty offers little concrete means by which cyber-warfare could be regulated.
Furthermore, the countries and organizations mainly engaged in space exploration, such as the United
States, the European Union, Russia, China, and Japan, have not ratified the treaty. As of January 1,
2011, only thirteen states had ratified and four signed the Moon Treaty. U.N. Office for Outer Space
Affairs, Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Status of International Agreements Relating to
Activities in Outer Space, U.N. Doc. ST/SPACE/11/Rev.2/Add/3 (2011).
249. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610
U.N.T.S. 205.
250. Id. art. 4.
251. Shackelford, supra note 218, at 219.
252. Celestial bodies “refers only to natural bodies, such as the moon, asteroids, and planets,
not to man-made satellites,” the main means in outer space by which cyber-warfare could be
conducted. Aldrich, supra note 218, at 20.
253. Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization,
“INTELSAT,” Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 3813 [hereinafter Telecommunications Satellite Agreement].
254. Convention of the International Maritime Satellite Organization London, Sept. 3, 1976,
31 U.S.T. 1 [hereinafter INMARSAT].
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However, despite the fact that satellites are likely to have a role in cyberattacks, these treaties have little utility in regulating attacks. The
Telecommunications Satellite Organization, which initially formed as an
intergovernmental body mandated to “carry forward . . . the design,
development, construction, establishment, operation and maintenance of the
space segment of the global commercial telecommunications satellite
system,”255 was privatized in 2000.256 Similarly, the Maritime Satellite
Organization has largely ceased to represent intergovernmental interests.257
Consequently, neither organization is well situated to promulgate public
regulations related to cyber-attacks.
4. Law of the Sea
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(“UNCLOS”)—particularly articles 19, 109, and 113—tangentially implicates
cyber-attack operations at sea.258 The article 19 obligation, which allows a
vessel the right of innocent passage through another nation’s territorial sea so
long as its activities are not “prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of
the coastal State,”259 is widely accepted as customary international law.260
Activities prohibited by article 19 include

255. Telecommunications Satellite Agreement, supra note 253, art. 2.
256. To “promote a more competitive global satellite services market,” the
Telecommunications Satellite Organization became a private company in 2000 named “Intelsat.” U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: INTELSAT PRIVATIZATION AND THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ORBIT ACT 1 (2004).
257. The Maritime Satellite Organization, originally founded as a nonprofit international
organization to establish a maritime satellite communications network, changed its name to
“International Mobile Satellite Organization” when it began to provide services to aircraft and portable
users. JONATHAN HIGGINS, SATELLITE NEWSGATHERING 247–48 (2d ed. 2007). In 1999, the
organization divided into two separate parts: most converted into a commercial company, and a small
group became the intergovernmental regulatory body, the International Mobile Satellite
Organization (IMSO). Id. at 248. Through a private-public partnership, the IMSO oversees certain
public satellite safety and security communication services provided by Inmarsat satellites.
258. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 19, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
3 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. The United States has not ratified the Convention on the Law of the Sea,
even though it has been abiding by the Convention since President Regan’s 1983 Statement of Oceans
Policy, and it signed the 1994 Agreement Relating to Implementation of Part XI. Nonetheless, many of
the provisions of the Convention are considered binding on the United States and other countries as
customary international law. Div. for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Table Recapitulating the
Status of the Convention and of the Related Agreements, as at 20 September 2011,
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/status2010.pdf; Senator Richard G. Lugar, The Law of
the Sea Convention: The Case for Senate Action, Address at the Brookings Institution (May 4, 2004),
available at http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2004/0504energy_lugar.aspx (discussing the United
States abiding by the Law of the Sea Convention).
259. UNCLOS, supra note 258, art. 19(1).
260. RÜDIGER WOLFRUM, FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION: NEW CHALLENGES (2008), available
at http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/statements_of_president/wolfrum/freedom_naviga
tion_080108_eng.pdf.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2134932

02-Hathaway (Do Not Delete)

2012]

7/6/2012 12:47:17 AM

THE LAW OF CYBER-ATTACK

873

(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial
integrity or political independence of the coastal State, or in
any other manner in violation of the principles of international
law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations;
...
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the
defence or security of the coastal State;
(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or
security of the coastal State;
...
(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of
communication or any other facilities or installations of the
coastal State . . . .261
These regulations, particularly part (k), could be read to prohibit cyber-attacks
that make use of computer systems on vessels that are at sea.
Similarly, article 109 stipulates that all states should cooperate in
suppressing unauthorized broadcasting from the high seas.262 UNCLOS defines
“unauthorized broadcasting” as “the transmission of sound radio or television
broadcasts from a ship or installation on the high seas intended for reception by
the general public contrary to international regulations, but excluding the
transmission of distress calls.”263 The prohibition could extend to a cyber-attack
that compromises the computer network that operates a ship’s broadcast
system.264 Similarly, article 113 requires states to put in place “laws and
regulations necessary” to punish willful damage to submarine cables, including
damage caused by a cyber-attack.265 Thus, by prohibiting actions that
undermine the functioning of communications systems at sea, these provisions
provide some minimal legal protections against cyber-attacks that occur on or
originate from the high seas.
Together, international law governing telecommunications, aviation,
space, and the sea provide potentially effective tools for addressing forms of
cyber-attack within specific contexts. Yet this patchwork of regulations fails to
provide a complete or coherent mechanism for addressing all forms of cyberattacks. Given the limits of current international law, the following Section
considers how U.S. domestic law might be used to address cyber-attacks.

261. UNCLOS, supra note 258, art. 19(2).
262. Id. art. 109(1).
263. Id. art. 109(2).
264. Id. art. 109(3). In particular, article 109(3) states that prosecution may occur in “the court
of: (a) the flag State of the ship; (b) the State of registry of the installation; (c) the State of which the
person is a national; (d) any State where the transmissions can be received; or (e) any State where
authorized radio communication is suffering interference.” Id.
265. Id. art. 113.
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D. U.S. Domestic Law
Domestic law offers an important tool for combating cyber-attacks,
including those that cross international borders. Because many cyber-attacks
are also cyber-crimes,266 domestic criminal law is particularly relevant.
Unfortunately, existing domestic law largely fails to directly address the novel
modern challenges posed by cyber-attacks,267 and is severely limited by its lack
of extraterritorial reach.
Although there is no U.S. federal statute that directly criminalizes cyberattacks,268 there is extensive federal criminal law that offers an important legal
tool for addressing cyber-attacks.269 At the federal level, criminal laws address
fraud involving devices, computers, or email;270 malicious interference in
communications lines, stations, or systems;271 electronic communication
interception;272 illicit access to electronic communications and records;273 and
recording of dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information.274
The majority of existing criminal laws bearing on cyber-attack do not
apply extraterritorially—that is, they do not reach criminal activity occurring
outside the United States.275 There are, however, some exceptions to that
266. See supra Part I.A.3 and Figure 1.
267. See, e.g., Sklerov, supra note 93, at 6 (“Unfortunately, state responses to cyberattacks are
governed by an anachronistic legal regime that impairs a state’s ability to defend itself.”).
268. As this Article went to print, several cyber-security bills had been proposed but none
passed. See Brendan Sasso, Senate Dems Modifying Cybersecurity Bill to Pick Up GOP Votes,
HILLICON VALLEY (May 6, 2012), http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/225607-senatedems-revamping-cybersecurity-bill-; Ellen Nakashima, On Hill, Imagining a Cyberattack on New
York, WASH. POST CHECKPOINT WASHINGTON (Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/checkpoint-washington/post/officials-use-nyc-blackout-scenario-to-sell-senators-on-cyberattack-legislation/2012/03/09/gIQA9Z530R_blog.html.
269. In addition to criminal liability, there have been proposals for the use of tort law against
cyber-attackers or intermediaries who negligently facilitate cyber-attack. See, e.g., Michael D. Scott,
Tort Liability for Vendors of Insecure Software: Has the Time Finally Come?, 67 MD. L. REV. 425
(2008); Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Mitigative Counterstriking: Self-Defense and Deterrence in
Cyberspace 1, 31–32 (2011) (unpublished research paper) (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1979857). Such proposals face a number of serious challenges, however,
including attribution and jurisdictional problems, id. at 30, and, for intermediaries, causation problems
and a virtual “tax on technophobia, punishing those who do not know enough about protecting their
personal computers,” id. at 32. Moreover, if software designers were held liable for leaving their
products vulnerable to cyber-attack, software costs could increase substantially. Id.
270. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1029, 1030, 1037 (2006). 18 U.S.C. § 1030 is the codification of the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.
271. Id. § 1362.
272. Id. §§ 2510–2522.
273. Id. §§ 2701–2712.
274. Id. §§ 3121–3127.
275. There is generally a presumption against extraterritorial application of federal law. See
United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744, 750 (9th Cir. 1973). Nevertheless, “Congress has the authority
to enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States,” and may do so by evidence
of its intent as gauged through statutory interpretation. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,
248 (1991) (internal citations omitted). In certain cases, extraterritorial reach may also be extended
without explicit or implied congressional authorization based on detrimental effects in the United
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general rule. For example, the criminal statute banning access device fraud, as
amended by the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, provides that
[a]ny person who, outside the jurisdiction of the United States, engages
in any act that, if committed within the jurisdiction of the United
States, would constitute an offense under . . . this section, shall be
subject to the fines, penalties, imprisonment, and forfeiture provided in
this title if—
1. the offense involves an access device issued, owned,
managed, or controlled by a[n] . . . entity within the
jurisdiction of the United States; and
2. the person transports, delivers, conveys, transfers to or
through, or otherwise stores, secrets, or holds within the
jurisdiction of the United States, any article used to assist in
the commission of the offense or the proceeds of such offense
or property derived therefrom.276
The statute banning computer fraud was likewise amended as part of the USA
PATRIOT Act to provide for extraterritorial applicability.277 Both of these
statutes may serve as useful models for extending extraterritorial application to
other domestic laws related to cyber-attack.
In addition, several recent legislative efforts tackle pieces of the cyberattack threat not addressed by U.S. criminal law. These include the
Cybersecurity Enhancement Act;278 the Executive Cyberspace Authorities Act
of 2010;279 the Rockefeller-Snowe Cybersecurity Act;280 the International
Cyberspace and Cybersecurity Coordination Act of 2010;281 and the Protecting
Cyberspace as a National Asset Act of 2010.282
The most widely discussed of these efforts has been the Protecting
Cyberspace as a National Asset Act, cowritten by Senators Lieberman, Collins,
and Carper, which was introduced in the Senate and the House in June 2010.283
The bill builds on the military’s recent establishment of the U.S. Cyber

States. See United States v. Muench, 694 F.2d 28, 33 (2d Cir. 1982) (“The intent to cause effects
within the United States . . . makes it reasonable to apply to persons outside United States territory a
statute which is not expressly extraterritorial in scope.”).
276. 18 U.S.C. § 1029 (2006); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES,
supra note 65, at 94, 115.
277. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006) (“[T]he term ‘protected computer’ [to which this statute applies]
means a computer . . . which is used in interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including a
computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign
commerce or communication of the United States.”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTING
COMPUTER CRIMES, supra note 66, at 5.
278. H.R. 4061, 111th Cong. (2010).
279. H.R. 5247, 111th Cong. (2010).
280. S. 773, 111th Cong. (2009).
281. S. 3193, 111th Cong. (2010).
282. S. 3480, 111th Cong. (2010); H.R. 5548, 111th Cong. (2010).
283. S. 3480; H.R. 5548.
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Command284 by proposing the establishment of two new administrative bodies:
(1) an Office of Cyberspace Policy in the White House, charged with
developing and coordinating a national strategy to increase the security and
resiliency of cyberspace; and (2) a National Center for Cybersecurity and
Communications within the Department of Homeland Security, designed to
“enable automated and continuous monitoring of any information collected”
and “use [of] the information to enhance the risk-based security of the Federal
information infrastructure.”285 The bill also addresses a wide range of related
cyber-security matters, including definitions and federal information security
management provisions.286
The bill sparked a vigorous debate over the proper role of the government
in regulating cyberspace. Opponents dubbed the proposed regulation the “kill
switch bill,” seeing it as an effort to grant the president emergency powers over
certain Internet communications.287 However, had it passed into law, the bill
would likely have established more checks on the president’s power to respond
to cyber-emergencies than currently exist.288 Its authors amended and
reintroduced the bill, but it has made little progress toward a vote on the Senate
floor.289 It has since been superseded by alternative proposals, none of which
has yet won the approval of Congress.290
This debate offers an important lesson for advocates of cyber-attack
regulation: any future law must clearly indicate what activities are to be
covered, place a high and transparent bar on emergency measures, and address
well-founded concerns that efforts to strengthen cyber-security might
simultaneously weaken free and open access to modern technology for those
engaging in political speech and organizing.
Other domestic legal efforts to address cyber-attacks are either based in
criminal law or have focused on developing U.S. defensive capabilities.
However, none of the recent legislative efforts that might strengthen defensive
capacity against cyber-attack have yet been made into law. Moreover, the
existing domestic law framework is insufficient for addressing the larger global

284. McMichael, supra note 39.
285. S. 3480; H.R. 5548.
286. S. 3480; H.R. 5548.
287. See Emelie Rutherford, Senate Committee OKs Cybersecurity Bill on Majority Leader’s
Radar, DEFENSE DAILY (June 25, 2010), http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_6712/is_61_246/
ai_n54561980/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2012). The bill has since been reintroduced with changes meant to
prevent the government from using a “kill switch” to shut off Internet service as a political tool. Id.; see
also Diane Bartz, Reid Pushes US Republicans for Cybersecurity Bill, REUTERS (July 27, 2011, 5:09
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/27/congress-cybersecurity-idUSN1E76Q1M320110727.
288. See, e.g., Rutherford, supra note 287 (describing congressional “frustration . . . that
people have misconstrued a provision related to the president’s emergency powers to take over
communications networks” when “[t]he president already has this authority, . . . and the bill would
restrict when he can use it”).
289. See id.; Bartz, supra note 287.
290. See supra note 268.
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problem.291 In particular, the lack of extraterritorial reach of most criminal laws
that apply to cyber-attacks severely limits their ability to reach those initiating
such cyber-attacks, who are often located outside the United States. The next
Part offers recommendations for remedying the substantial limitations of both
the domestic and international legal frameworks for addressing cyber-attack.
IV.
NEW LAW FOR CYBER-ATTACKS
Cyber-attacks present a new and growing threat—one that current
international and domestic laws are not yet fully prepared to meet. The law of
war offers a basis for responding only to those cyber-attacks that amount to an
armed attack or that take place in the context of an ongoing armed conflict.
Other existing international legal frameworks offer only embryonic or
piecemeal protection. U.S. domestic law, though potentially a powerful tool for
battling cyber-attacks, has not yet addressed the challenge directly, and what
remedies exist are in many cases restricted by jurisdictional limits.
To begin to fill the gaps in existing law, we propose legal reform on both
domestic and international levels.292 Our recommended domestic law reforms
are twofold. First, the United States should add extraterritorial applicability to
criminal laws bearing on cyber-attack. Second, the United States should utilize
limited countermeasures, as appropriate, to combat cyber-attacks that do not
rise to the level of armed attacks under the law of war.
These domestic measures will address elements of the problem, but
getting at the root of the global cyber-attack challenge will require international
solutions. We therefore recommend an international cyber-treaty with two
central aims. First, such an agreement should provide a definition of cyberattacks and cyber-warfare that limits the cyber-attacks to which states may
respond with force. Second, the treaty should empower states to cooperate in
evidence collection and criminal prosecution of individuals involved in
transnational cyber-attacks. While this second aim will likely be a longer-term
project, it offers the only truly effective solution to the inherently international
problem of cyber-attacks.

291. See Andy Johnson & Kyle Spector, Deterring Cyber War: A U.S.-Led Cybersecurity
Summit, THIRD WAY 3 (Oct. 2010), available at http://content.thirdway.org/publications/343/Third_
Way_Idea_Brief_-_Deterring_Cyber_War-A_US-Led_Cybersecurity_Summit.pdf (last visited Apr.
22, 2012).
292. We focus here on potential legal reforms. In addition to legal reform, government should
coordinate with the private sector to address cyber-attack threats. Indeed, the Obama administration
has recognized that “[e]nsuring the resilience of our networks and information systems requires
collective and concerted national action that spans the whole of government, in collaboration with the
private sector and individual citizens.” WHITE HOUSE CYBERSPACE STRATEGY, supra note 63, at 13.
The U.S. Department of Defense has also suggested that there may be a need for “incentives or other
measures . . . to promote private sector participation.” DOD STRATEGY, supra note 32, at 9. The legal
reforms outlined here are meant to compliment such cooperative measures, not substitute for them.
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A. Battling Cyber-Attacks at Home
1. Extend the Extraterritorial Reach of Domestic Law
As noted above, a number of existing and proposed domestic laws may
play a role in combating cyber-attacks, including numerous criminal statutes
regulating harmful cyber-activity outside the context of armed conflict.293 It is
important to recall that domestic criminal law alone cannot regulate cyberattacks because not all cyber-attacks are defined as cyber-crimes. But many
cyber-attacks—including those involving non–state actors and computer-based
means—are also cyber-crimes that fall within the ambit of domestic criminal
law.294 Unfortunately, only a small number of existing criminal laws that might
govern cyber-attacks explicitly provide for extraterritorial reach.295
To remedy this limitation, legislators could amend domestic criminal
statutes to give them extraterritorial reach. If other states reciprocate by making
their own criminal statutes pertaining to cyber-attacks extraterritorial as well,
this could greatly increase global enforcement.296 Indeed, increased domestic
enforcement through extraterritorial application will be much more successful
and legitimate if it takes place in concert with the creation of an international
treaty that establishes basic shared standards regarding cyber-attacks.
Even if domestic criminal laws that apply to cyber-attacks extend across
borders, jurisdictional hurdles will likely hamper enforcement by any
individual state. It may be difficult, for example, for the United States to gain
custody of accused cyber-criminals operating abroad, particularly if they are
not U.S. citizens or operate in countries that do not have extradition treaties
with the United States. Thus, strengthened extradition relationships around the
world would complement increased extraterritorial application of domestic law.
Though dramatic improvement in extradition relationships may not be
immediately feasible given that extradition treaties, which are negotiated on a
bilateral basis, take substantial time and effort to negotiate and pass, such
relationships could help effectuate the prosecution of many crimes resulting
from increasing globalization including drug, weapon, and human trafficking,
and transnational white-collar crime.297 Thus, the United States should
prioritize the development of these relationships moving forward.
Further, the United States, and the global community in general, should
endeavor to explicitly criminalize aspects of cyber-attacks that fall outside the

293. See supra Part III.D.
294. See supra Part I.A.3.
295. See supra Part III.D.
296. This extraterritorial reach would not regulate cyber-actions taken by governments but
rather those of individuals and other non–state actors.
297. See generally John T. Soma, et al., Transnational Extradition for Computer Crimes: Are
New Treaties and Laws Needed?, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 317 (1997) (discussing the limitations of
current extradition treaties and proposing potential reforms).
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scope of existing domestic or international law, including the law of war. In the
present absence of an international cyber-crime agreement, it is possible for the
United States to more effectively counter cyber-attacks through carefully
crafted and narrowly framed domestic law.
2. Countermeasures in Response to Cyber-Attacks
Although the international law of countermeasures has played a minimal
role in legal debates around cyber-attacks thus far, it nonetheless offers an
extremely useful legal framework for states seeking to respond to a cyberattack. The United States and other countries interested in regulating cyberattacks should begin to develop a policy defining the types of countermeasures
legally and strategically appropriate for different types of cyber-attacks.
As noted in the discussion of jus ad bellum above, the vast majority of
cyber-attacks do not rise to the level of an armed attack.298 But armed selfdefense is not the only manner in which states can respond to cyber-attacks.
Provided that the initial cyber-attack violates an international obligation of the
perpetrating state, the victim state is entitled under customary international law
to employ necessary and proportional countermeasures designed to induce the
perpetrating state to resume compliance with international norms and to stop
conducting (or allowing) cyber-attacks from its territory.299
While active defense is the most commonly discussed type of
countermeasure that might be employed in response to a cyber-attack, it is only
one option among many.300 A key limit to a legally permissible countermeasure
is that it must be proportional to the injury suffered by the victim state.301
Moreover, countermeasures must be designed to enable a return to the status
quo ante, in which both the perpetrating and victim states comply with their
relevant legal duties towards one another.302 Countermeasures must be
temporary so that once the cyber-attacks stop, the countermeasure may stop as
well and normal international relations may resume.303
The Draft Articles on State Responsibility express a preference for
reciprocal countermeasures, but this is not a requirement.304 Still, the closer the
relationship between the breach and countermeasure the more likely the
countermeasure is to be proportional and therefore lawful.305 The United States
should consider in advance what international obligations it has toward likely
cyber-aggressor states that it might lawfully revoke in case of an unlawful

298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

See supra Part II.A.
See Draft Articles, supra note 109, art. 49.
See Sklerov, supra note 93, at 2 n.5 (comparing active and passive defenses).
See Draft Articles, supra note 109, art. 51.
See id. art. 49(1).
See id. art. 49.
See id. pt. 3, ch. 2, cmt., ¶ 5.
Id.
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cyber-attack. Indeed, the United States could develop a policy regarding the
types of countermeasures legally available in response to particular types of
cyber-attacks.
B. A Cyber-Attack Treaty
Changes in domestic law and policy, such as adding extraterritorial reach
to criminal laws and planning for the use of countermeasures, are valuable legal
responses to the threat of cyber-attack. Yet to truly address the cyber-attack
challenge, international coordination will be necessary.306 The scope of the
problem is global, and the solution must be as well. As the U.S. Department of
Defense has explained, “cyberspace is a network of networks that includes
thousands of ISPs [internet service providers] across the globe; no single state
or organization can maintain effective cyber defenses on its own.”307
The United States has developed a Cyberspace Strategy that emphasizes
working “with like-minded states to establish an environment of expectations,
or norms of behavior, that ground foreign and defense polices and guide
international partnerships.”308 While the development of international norms is
useful, it will not provide governments and private actors with the clarity of a
codified definition of cyber-attack or written guidelines on how states should
respond to certain types of challenges. For this reason, we recommend that the
international community create a multilateral agreement with two central
features. First, it must offer a shared definition of cyber-crime, cyber-attack,
and cyber-warfare.309 Second, it should offer a framework for more robust
international cooperation in information sharing, evidence collection, and
criminal prosecution of those participating in cross-national cyber-attacks. That
framework should be attentive to the challenges of overcriminalization,
maintaining room for individuals to use the Internet and related technologies to
engage in lawful dissent.310

306. As discussed in Part III.B, there have already been several efforts to create a cyber-attack
treaty. See CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 7, at 268–71 (arguing for a Cyber War Limitations Treaty);
cf. JACK GOLDSMITH, CYBERSECURITY TREATIES: A SKEPTICAL VIEW (2011) (offering a skeptical
take on the possibility of a cyber-security treaty). Russia has for some time been proposing a treaty
banning cyber-attack. See, e.g., John Markoff & Andrew E. Kramer, U.S. and Russia Differ on Treaty
for Cyberspace, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2009, at A1 (“Russia favors an international treaty along the
lines of those negotiated for chemical weapons and has pushed for that approach at a series of
meetings . . . and in public statements . . . .”). Yet the shape of the agreement proposed here is quite
different—it begins with securing a shared agreement on the activity meant to be prohibited.
307. DOD STRATEGY, supra note 32, at 9.
308. WHITE HOUSE CYBERSPACE STRATEGY, supra note 63, at 9. The United States is
currently prepared to build bilateral and multilateral partnerships, to work with regional organizations,
and to collaborate with the private sector. See id. at 12.
309. It is worth noting again that cyber-attacks that do constitute use of force under the law of
war are already covered by jus in bello principles, which may be more clearly defined over time in the
cyber-attack context through state practice. See also supra Part II.B.
310. See WHITE HOUSE CYBERSPACE STRATEGY, supra note 63, at 7.
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1. Define Cyber-Attack and Cyber-Warfare
The first aim of a cyber-attack treaty regime should be to develop a shared
definition of cyber-attack, cyber-crime, and cyber-warfare. These definitions
could serve as the foundation for domestic criminal legislation targeting cyberattacks and cyber-crime as well as more extensive international cooperation. A
similar strategy has been used, for example, in the international effort to battle
bribery: the OECD Bribery Convention provides a definition of bribery that
state parties then integrate into national legislation forbidding the practice.311
Under the Bribery Convention, “signatories pledged to criminalize and
prosecute the bribery of foreign public officials.”312 The thirty-eight state
parties have then used that shared definition as the basis for domestic
implementing legislation.313
We have proposed a definition of cyber-attack that would include any
action taken to undermine the function of a computer network for a political or
national security purpose. An appropriate definition of cyber-crime would
include any violation of criminal law by non–state actors, committed by means
of a computer system. Finally, cyber-warfare should be defined as a cyberattack that causes physical injury or property damage comparable to a
conventional armed attack.
States could adopt a clear definition of cyber-attack, cyber-crime, and
cyber-warfare in the context of a comprehensive binding treaty, nonbinding
declaration, or through independent agreements in anticipation of more broadbased future cooperation. Even a stand-alone nonbinding defining declaration
could provide an important starting point for future cooperation if it provides a
definition that is later incorporated into a more comprehensive international
treaty.314 Such a document could offer much-needed clarity on when cyber311. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 4 (1998) [hereinafter OECD Bribery Convention]. Under the
Convention, the “Offense of Bribery of Foreign Public Officials” is defined as
intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether
directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that official or for a third
party, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of
official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the
conduct of international business.
Id. art. 1(1).
312. Developments in the Law – Extraterritoriality, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1226, 1285 (2011);
see OECD Bribery Convention, supra note 311, art 1(1) (“Each Party shall take such measures as may
be necessary to establish that [bribery] is a criminal offence under its law.”).
313. OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: National Implementing Legislation, ORG. FOR ECON.
CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/document/30/0,3746,en_2649_34859_2027102_1_1_1_
1,00.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). Unfortunately, it appears that few countries have actually been
enforcing the domestic antibribery provisions. See Developments in the Law, supra note 312, at 1285.
314. The idea that a nonbinding, defining declaration can provide a basis for negotiating a
subsequent binding treaty is illustrated by the successful U.N. effort to criminalize torture and other
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. Before the Convention Against Torture was adopted by the
U.N. General Assembly in 1984, the General Assembly adopted the Declaration Against Torture.
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec.
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attacks amount to an armed conflict that warrants self-defense,315 and could
offer a common reference point for subsequent domestic criminal legislation.
Even an agreement limited to common definitions will likely face
challenges.316 In particular, it will be necessary to bridge fairly substantial
divides between the United States and other leading cyber-powers that have a
more expansive view of what activity ought to be criminalized through
international cooperation, including some forms of legitimate political
dissent.317 As noted earlier, Russia and other members of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization have been promoting an international agreement
banning cyber-attack for some time,318 but their focus differs greatly from that
of the United States and much of Europe in the cyber-attack arena.319 A key
challenge of this first stage agreement will thus be to find common ground with
major cyber-powers without expanding the definition of cyber-attack in ways
that would quell free speech and democratic political organization.
2. International Cooperation on Evidence Collection and Criminal Prosecution
Once states develop a shared definition of cyber-attacks, cyber-crime, and
cyber-warfare, the next step is more extensive cooperation among states on
10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT]; CHRIS INGELSE, THE UN COMMITTEE AGAINST
TORTURE: AN ASSESSMENT 73 (2001). The Declaration described consensus on key elements of the
definition of torture. These included “the infliction of severe physical or mental pain or suffering,”
intentional infliction of pain and suffering, the action or sanction of a public official, and conduct that
serves a proscribed purpose, “such as obtaining information or a confession.” Id. at 70. The
Declaration provided much of the substance that later was incorporated into the Convention Against
Torture, which has been ratified by 149 states, including the United States. See Status, Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (last visited Nov. 8,
2011). In fact, the Swedish draft of the Convention, which formed the basis of the negotiations, used
the exact text of the definition of torture from the Declaration. INGELSE, supra, at 74. Unfortunately,
the draft Sweden submitted to the 34th Session, E/CN.4/1285, is not available on the U.N. Documents
database.
315. The White House predicts that shared understanding about norms of acceptable cyberbehavior will bring “predictability to state conduct, helping prevent the misunderstandings that could
lead to conflict.” WHITE HOUSE CYBERSPACE STRATEGY, supra note 63, at 9. As a result, the strategy
commits the United States to take the lead in building consensus on norms of cyber-behavior. Id. at 18.
316. Indeed, some have suggested that a successful treaty may be nearly impossible to achieve,
at least in the short term. See, e.g., Waxman, supra note 24, at 425–26 (“[N]ot only do certain features
of cyber-activities make international legal regulation very difficult, but major actors also have
divergent strategic interests that will pull their preferred doctrinal interpretations and aspirations in
different directions, impeding formation of a stable international consensus.”); GOLDSMITH, supra
note 306, at 12 (“This paper has argued that the fundamental clash of interests concerning the
regulation of electronic communications, the deep constraints the United States would have to adopt to
receive reciprocal benefits in a cybersecurity treaty, and the debilitating verification problems will
combine to make it unfeasible to create a cybersecurity treaty that purports to constrain
governments.”). For a dissenter’s view on the appropriate international response to cyber-attack, see
Duncan B. Hollis, An E-SOS for Cyberspace, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 373 (2011) (arguing for a duty to
assist cyber-threat victims, rather than regulation of bad cyber-actors).
317. See supra text accompanying notes 21–26.
318. See Markoff & Kramer, supra note 306.
319. See supra text accompanying notes 24–26.
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information sharing, evidence collection, and criminal prosecution of those
involved in cyber-attacks. A useful starting point for building such a treaty is
the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, described in Part III.B.3,
which provides for harmonized regulation of a wide range of cyber-crimes.
This treaty remains largely limited to Europe (though the United States has
ratified the agreement) and it does not address all cyber-attacks that a
comprehensive agreement would ideally regulate.320 Nonetheless, it provides a
framework from which a more comprehensive agreement might begin.
Building on this framework, the new agreement should require parties to
pass domestic laws banning the cyber-attack-related conduct prohibited under
the treaty, so as to harmonize laws across states. The agreement could begin
with information-sharing, layering on additional mechanisms for fostering
cooperation in identifying and stopping the sources of cyber-attacks through
criminal law enforcement agencies. International cooperation in information
sharing could be an extremely valuable complement to other regulation of
cyber-attacks.321
Member states could agree to share access to cyber-related information
with other member states. That information would not be available to
nonmembers or to states that fail to comply with the treaty’s core obligations.
Offering privileged access to information to member states in good standing
would provide states with an incentive to participate in and comply with the
treaty regime.322
Finally, consistent with the Tunis Commitment323 and Agenda,324 a treaty
could encourage more-technologically-developed countries to assist lessdeveloped ones in responding to shared cyber-threats. As the recent White
House Cyberspace Strategy memo observed,
Enhancing national-level cybersecurity among developing nations is of
immediate and long-term benefit [to the United States and all nations],
as more states are equipped to confront threats emanating from within
their borders and in turn, build confidence in globally interconnected

320. Convention on Cybercrime, Chart of Signatures and Ratifications, COUNCIL OF EUR.
(last visited Apr. 21, 2012), http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&
CL=ENG. Canada, Japan, and South Africa are the other non-European signatories, but the United
States is the only one of the four that has ratified the Convention. Id.
321. Information sharing in this context was endorsed by a group of experts from countries as
diverse as the United States, China, and Russia in a 2010 report to the U.N. Secretary-General. Report
of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, supra note 186, at 8.
322. This proposal aims to harness the power of outcasting to build a strong treaty regime. See
Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: The Enforcement of Domestic and International Law,
121 YALE L. J. 252 (2011).
323. Tunis Commitment, WORLD SUMMIT ON THE INFO. SOC’Y (Nov. 18, 2005),
http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/7.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).
324. Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, WORLD SUMMIT ON THE INFO. SOC’Y (Nov.
18, 2005), http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2134932

02-Hathaway (Do Not Delete)

884

7/6/2012 12:47:17 AM

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:817

networks and cooperate across borders to combat criminal misuse of
information technologies. It is also essential to cultivating dynamic,
international research communities able to take on next-generation
challenges to cybersecurity.325
Because any country’s cyber-security can be compromised by its allies’
security gaps, a collective attempt to prevent cyber-attacks must include efforts
to improve the defenses of partner countries as well.326
Another challenge to any comprehensive cyber-attack treaty is the
difficulty of verifying where cyber-attacks originate.327 Uncertainty in tracing
and attributing a cyber-attack “makes retaliation for breach much harder for
any president or general to order.”328 Yet while verification of a cyber-attack’s
origin is difficult, even those who have expressed skepticism about the shortterm feasibility of a cyber-treaty acknowledge that it is not impossible. As Jack
Goldsmith has put it, “Sometimes traceback and related forensic tools can
provide good-enough attribution.”329 Indeed, while negotiations on the treaty
are underway, states should continue a parallel technical effort to enhance their
capacities to trace the source of cyber-attacks.
As General Keith Alexander, chief of the new U.S. Cyber Command,
explained earlier this year when reopening negotiations with Russia on this
issue, “We do have to establish the lanes of the road” for what cyber-activities
governments can and cannot pursue.330 Establishing those lanes is the necessary
first step to addressing the challenge of cyber-attacks. Only once they are in
place will verification challenges become salient.
CONCLUSION
The emergence of Stuxnet in 2010 heralded a new era for cyber-attacks.
Although its damage was apparently limited to the Iranian nuclear program it
was designed to attack, it revealed how vulnerable even nation-states are to
cyber-attacks. Indeed, by the time it was discovered, Stuxnet had wormed its
way into computer networks around the world.
Cyber-attacks on vital infrastructure are already becoming widespread.
Cyber-security professionals report that the computer infrastructure has become
more vulnerable even in just a year.331 And yet, while the threat of cyber-

325. WHITE HOUSE CYBERSPACE STRATEGY, supra note 63, at 15.
326. Shanker & Bumiller, supra note 53 (noting that the United States’ allies are “all over the
map” on cyber-security issues, according to James Lewis, an expert on computer network warfare at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies).
327. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 306, at 10–12.
328. Id. at 11.
329. Id. at 10.
330. Siobhan Gorman, U.S. Backs Talks on Cyber Warfare, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2010, at A3.
331. Mark Clayton, Security Lags Cyberattack Threats in Critical Industries, Report Finds,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 20, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2011/0420/Security-lagscyberattack-threats-in-critical-industries-report-finds (citing a global survey of 200 computer security
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attacks has rapidly grown, the response has not kept pace. This Article has
shown that both the U.S. government and the international community have
thus far largely failed to update legal frameworks that might respond to cyberattacks. To face new and growing threats, governments continue to rely on
limited and piecemeal bodies of law not designed to meet the challenge of
cyber-attacks.
It is past time to begin a conversation about the scope of the threat posed
by cyber-attacks and the best ways to meet it. The United States should expand
the reach of domestic law abroad and develop a system for utilizing limited
countermeasures where appropriate to respond to certain types of cyber-attacks.
Yet the United States is restricted in what it can accomplish alone. Cyberattacks are often transnational—designed by authors in multiple countries, run
through networks across the world, and used to undermine computer systems in
countries where those designing the attack have never set foot. This global
threat may only be effectively met by a global solution—by the international
community working together to design a new law for cyber-attacks.

professionals working in critical infrastructure industries, “In the Dark: Crucial Industries Confront
Cyberattacks”).
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